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For the average Spaniard receiving a pension still means receiving a
public pension. Among retired individuals, those drawing more than 10
percent of their annual income from a private pension plan are a negligible
fraction (less than one percent). The situation, while slowly evolving, will
not change substantially for another two decades or more. In 1990, the to-
tal number of participants in all kinds of private pension plans was of
600,000—less than 5 percent of total employment at the time. Since then,
participation in pension funds has increased rapidly but not exceptionally,
reaching a total of 4 million at the end of 1999. This is slightly less than 30
percent of current total employment and is mostly composed of individu-
als that are at relatively early stages of their working life. It is therefore rea-
sonable to expect that, at least for the next two to three decades, the public
pension system will remain the fundamental provider of old age income for
Spanish citizens.
Over the course of year 2000, the number of Spanish workers covered
by the Social Security Administration (the general regime plus the special
regimes) is estimated at around 14.9 million (it was 14.6 million at the end
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fully acknowledged.eral de la Seguridad Social (RGSS) and the rest by the special regimes. This
corresponds to the practical totality of Spanish private-sector workforce
(see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi [2001] for further details). En-
rollment in the Spanish social security (SS) programs grew remarkably fast
during the last three years, in fact, much faster than actual employment
asestimated by the Spanish labor force Survey, Encuesta de Población Ac-
tiva (EPA; Instituto Nacional de Estadística [INE] 2002). More precisely,
the number of individuals enrolled in the SS administration grew at annual
rates of 3.5, 5.7, and 6.0 percent in 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively. The
growth rate for 2000 is estimated to be around 3.7 percent. Such excep-
tional growth in the ranks of the SS administration is only partly explained
by the favorable cyclical conditions during the period 1996–2000. A sub-
stantial portion of the increase in the number of contributors is likely to
reﬂect a one-time emersion from the underground economy. This should
be attributed partly to structural changes in the Spanish labor market and
partly to an eﬀort of the current administration to reduce contributive
fraud. Hence, we should not extrapolate these growth rates in the future,
even assuming that the current growth rate of the economy could be main-
tained, which, as 2001 and 2002 have shown, it cannot.
The total number of contributive pensions, as of the end of 1999, was 7.6
million. The growth rate in the number of contributive pensions was 2.6
percent in 1996, 1.96 percent in 1997, 1.52 percent in 1998, 1.26 percent in
1999, and 1.24 percent (estimated) in 2000. The functional composition of
the stock of contributive pension payments is the following: Retirement
pensions are 59 percent of the total, survival pensions 26 percent, disabil-
ity 11 percent, orphans 3 percent, and those to other family members 1
percent. The division by SS regimes gives 55 percent to the RGSS, followed
by  the farmers special regime (RETA) with 21 percent, and the self-
employed regime (REA) with 11 percent. The other, much smaller, special
regimes share the residual 10 percent.
For the year 2000, expenditure on public pensions in Spain is expected
to equal PTA9,229.7 billion, approximately 9.5 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). By adding noncontributive and welfare pensions, total
pension payments reach about 10.2 percent of GDP. This number is lower
than previously forecasted and, in fact, lower than it was in 1996 and 1997.
This is due to the strong growth performance of the Spanish economy over
the four years from 1997 to 2000, which was continuing on into 2001. SS
contributions in 1999 amounted to 9.4 percent of GDP and were expected
to remain at about the same percentage level in 2000.
The functional distribution of payments reﬂects the diﬀerence in average
pension between old age and other functions. So, expenditure for old age
is 68 percent of the total, while survival beneﬁts are 19 percent, and dis-
ability is 12 percent of the total. During the year 2000, the total expendi-
ture for contributive pensions amounted to PTA8,300 billion (about US$
500 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi45 billion at the exchange rate of late November 2000), which corresponds
to slightly less than 10 percent of Spanish GDP.
Figure 9.1 reports the evolution of the ratio of pension expenditures P
to GDP, during the last two decades. We also report, on the right vertical
axis, the ratio between total expenditure of the Spanish SS system and
GDP. Beside pensions, total expenditure includes expenditure for tempo-
rary illness, maternity or paternity, family support, public health services,
and social services. Data show that the tendency to grow is not limited to
pension expenditures: While the ratio between pension expenditure and
GDP grew by 52 percent between 1980 and 1998, the one between total ex-
penditure and GDP grew by 53 percent over the same period. The rule, at
least in Spain, seems to be that when pension expenditure accelerates, to-
tal expenditure of the SS system accelerates as well.
It is hard to judge whether the recent ﬂattening of the trend line of the
P-GDP ratio, should be considered as the beginning of a new phase or in-
stead just a cyclical event without substantial long-run implication. The
growth rate of the number of pensions does not appear to slow down. The
same goes for the size of the average pension. Our analysis leads to the con-
clusion that the second interpretation is more likely, even if some small
structural changes have taken place. Before going on to illustrate the long-
run tendencies and their eﬀects, we should brieﬂy mention the steps that
were taken in a new direction.
The Spanish labor market is more ﬂexible after the 1997 agreement be-
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Fig. 9.1 Social security and pension expenditures and GDP, 1980–1998tween the government and the trade unions. Firing costs are slightly lower,
and contracts that allow for dismissal can be signed. This shows positive
eﬀects on registered employment, which has been growing at near histori-
cal record rates since 1997. Labor force participation rates among women
keep increasing. This is strictly linked to the higher school-attendance rates
women have experienced since the middle 1980s, which appear to continue.
This structural change in educational attainments has become an impor-
tant factor, which may have a dramatic impact on the Spanish labor mar-
ket during the next two or three decades. It is likely to increase labor force
participation rates at all ages and for women, in particular.
Meanwhile, if legislation is not modiﬁed, (which we ﬁnd unlikely in light
of the political-economy mechanism driving public pension systems) by
2005–2010, the number of workers having the right to retire before the age
of sixty-ﬁve will dwindle to almost zero. Current legislation allows this
privilege only to those who started contributing before 1967.1 Currently
this constitutes the bulk of the retirees or near-retirees. Within a decade,
this may provide a one-time boost to labor force participation rates for the
age group sixty to sixty-ﬁve.
For a long time, an alarming feature of the retirement behavior of Span-
ish workers has been the large fraction retiring and drawing pensions be-
fore the normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve (see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín,
and Peracchi 2001 for detailed time series). The percentage of new pen-
sioners strictly younger than sixty-ﬁve seems to have peaked at 71.6 per-
cent in 1995, decreasing slowly in subsequent years. It was 68.2 percent in
1998. The percentage of those retiring at sixty may have peaked at 46.5 per-
cent in 1997 and decreased marginally in 1998, the last year for which such
data are available. This pattern is linked to the phasing out of the special
legislation mentioned in the previous paragraph.
On the other side, there are a number of facts that should make us pause.
The large and persistent discrepancies reported between enrollment rates
in the SS programs and the employment levels estimated by the EPA sug-
gest that the record increase in SS enrollment is partly due to the emergence
of the black labor market. This has two implications. First, it cannot be
excluded that in a recession period the same workers would go “under-
ground” again and stop contributing. Secondly, it implies that most of the
1997–2000 growth of employment is actually a statistical artifact. This ﬁts
well with the very low growth rate of labor productivity (0.2–0.5 percent)
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1. In fact, following a new pact between the government and trade unions, legislation is be-
ing modiﬁed at the time of last writing (Spring 2002) to extend the right of early retirement at
sixty to workers who enrolled in the SS system after 1967. According to the pact, early retire-
ment for workers between the age of sixty and sixty-ﬁve will be possible under conditions es-
sentially identical to those reported in the sequel of this paper. This fact vindicates our earlier
pessimistic views about early retirement (see, e.g., Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi
2001).measured over the last four years. Should this pessimistic interpretation
turn out to be correct, we would just be facing a (once-and-for-all) jump in
SS enrollment levels.
Furthermore, recent legislation (fall 1999) has once again increased the
real value of minimum pensions by about 3 to 5 percentage points. Besides
raising the overall pension burden, this policy has negative eﬀects on par-
ticipation rates. As clearly shown in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Perac-
chi (1999), minimum pensions are one of the major determinants of early
retirement, especially among low earners. This suggests that the political
willingness to increase pension expenditure to please special interest
groups and to maintain the distortionary eﬀects of current legislation has
not been reduced by the arrival of a new government.
A few other basic structural factors are illustrated next; for detailed sta-
tistics about Spanish demographic evolution and labor market, we refer to
Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi (2001).
Table 9.1 presents the evolution of the structure of the Spanish popula-
tion in the 1950–2050 period. We break down the total population in three
representative age groups: zero to fourteen, ﬁfteen to sixty-four, and sixty-
ﬁve and older. There are two salient features. On the one hand, the young
population (zero to fourteen), after peaking in 1970, has steadily de-
creased. Currently the size of each generation of newborns is half the size
of the same generation twenty years ago. On the other hand, the portion of
the population sixty-ﬁve and older has continuously increased and will
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Table 9.1 Structure of the Spanish Population and Life Expectancy
Life Expectancy
Structure of the Population At 0 At 65
Year 0–14 15–64 65+ Male Female Male Female
1950 26.23 66.54 7.23 59.81 64.32 11.83 13.48
1970 27.79 62.54 9.67 69.17 74.69 13.25 15.89
1981 25.70 63.06 11.24 70.40 16.19 13.58 16.44
1986 22.12 65.60 13.94 73.27 79.67 15.10 18.43
1991 18.63 67.43 13.94 73.40 80.49 15.53 19.17
1996 15.81 68.54 15.65 74.30 81.6 16.00 20.10
2000 14.58 68.54 16.88 75.30 82.4 n.a. n.a.
2010 13.13 68.73 18.14 76.40 83.4 n.a. n.a.
2020 11.16 68.23 20.61 77.20 84.0 n.a. n.a.
2030 12.5 62.70 24.80 77.80 84.5 n.a. n.a.
2040 12.6 57.10 30.30 78.20 84.8 n.a. n.a.
2050 12.8 53.90 33.30 78.50 84.9 n.a. n.a.
Source: INE (1995) and Cordón (1999).
Note: n.a.   not available.reach 20 percent of the population before 2020. Furthermore, life ex-
pectancy at zero and at sixty-ﬁve has been growing steadily since 1950 and
is expected to grow considerably also in the forthcoming years. In 2020, life
expectancy at birth is expected to reach 76.0 and 83.7 for men and women,
respectively.
Historically, Spain has an extremely low ratio of contributors to pen-
sioners (oscillating around 2 and equal to 2.02 and 2.06 in 1998 and 1999,
respectively). Its long-run value could be somewhat higher for purely com-
positional reasons, as the ratio for RGSS and RETA was 2.52 and 2.84, re-
spectively, in 1998, while it was well below unity for all other downsizing
regimes (from 0.29 for miners to 0.77 for ﬁshermen).
The pattern of labor force participation in Spain is similar, from a qual-
itative viewpoint, to the rest of continental and non-Scandinavian Europe
(France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium). Although Spain has higher unem-
ployment and a lower labor force participation rate (LFPR), especially
among females, the dynamics have been very similar since Spain joined the
European Union (EU) in 1986. As a matter of fact, recent trends (post-
1996) are better than those in the other large European countries; most
likely some form of convergence in labor market variables is taking place
alongside convergence in per capita GDP and labor productivity. Immi-
gration policies and outcomes are an exception to the former statement:
Immigrants ﬂow into Spain at a much lower rate than in the rest of conti-
nental Europe, and Spain does not seem to be prone to policies to encour-
age immigration (recent political debate conﬁrms this posture). This is
conﬁrmed by the extremely low number of working permits issued to for-
eigners over the last ﬁve years: 88.620 (1994), 100.290 (1995), 126.407
(1996), 86.841 (1997), and 40.440 (1998). On average this represents about
0.5 percent of the workforce. The remarkable decline in number of work-
ing permits since the Popular Party (PP) came to power in 1996, in spite of
the increased pressure from illegal immigrants landing on the Spanish
coast, is particularly noticeable.
The rest of this paper is organized in seven sections. The next one, sec-
tion 9.2, provides an overview of the technical rules underlying the Span-
ish public pension system. Section 9.3 describes our micro-economic data
set, illustrates its main limitations, and outlines the steps taken to over-
come such limitations. (Additional material complementing sections 9.2
and 9.3 can be found in the appendix.) In section 9.4, we proceed to char-
acterize the sample distribution of earnings and our estimated projections.
Section 9.5 uses such projections to compute the various measures of re-
tirement incentives used in this study. Such retirement incentive measures
are the inputs for the estimation of the retirement models, which is under-
taken in section 9.6. Section 9.7 studies three simple policy reforms and
evaluates their diﬀerential impact upon the retirement incentives; section
9.8 brieﬂy concludes.
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9.2.1 Public Programs for Old-Age Workers
Table 9.2 summarizes the programs available after age ﬁfty. Besides pri-
vate pensions, there are three other public programs that aﬀect the behav-
ior of old age workers: unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, and re-
tirement pensions.
Unemployment beneﬁts (UB) are generally conditional on a previous
spell of contributions (see appendix) and are available only for workers in
the RGSS.2 There are two continuation programs for those who have ex-
hausted their entitlement to contributory UB: one for those aged forty-ﬁve
and older (UB45  program) and another for those aged ﬁfty-two and
older (UB52  program). The latter program is a special subsidy for un-
employed people that are older than ﬁfty-two, lack income sources, have
contributed to unemployment insurance for at least six years and, except
for age, satisfy all requirements for an old age pension. To avoid cluttering
the main text, we describe the various provisions of both programs in the
appendix.
The SS system provides insurance against both temporary and perma-
nent illness as well as disability. Contributory disability (DI) beneﬁts are
far more generous than any other old age program since they are not sub-
ject to penalties for young age or insuﬃcient years of contribution.3The DI
beneﬁts are subject to approval by a medical examiner (the tightness of the
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Table 9.2 Public Programs at Older Ages
Unemployment Disability Private Social Security
Age Insurance Insurance Pension Plan Beneﬁts
50 Cont. from 45+ Cont./Noncont. Yes a
52 Cont. from 52+ Cont./Noncont. Yes a
55 Cont. from 52% Cont./Noncont. Yes a
60 Cont. Cont./Noncont. Yes ER: Cont.
65 — — Yes NR: Cont./Noncont.
Notes: Cont.   contributory; Noncont.   noncontributory; ER   early retirement; NR  
normal retirement; 45+ and 52+ indicate a special UI program for 45+ and 52+ workers en-
rolled in the RGSS. All public programs provide beneﬁts for dependant. Dashes indicate that
data are not relevant.
aThere are age bonuses for certain professions, allowing for retirement before 60.
2. People enrolled in RESS have either no access to UB (self-employed and household em-
ployees) or have special unemployment (farmers and ﬁshermen).
3. For a discussion of noncontributory disability pensions and other marginal insurance
schemes (which are not relevant to the following analysis and have little or no impact on the
retirement decisions of the workers we are considering) see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and
Peracchi (1999).admissibility criteria used by examiners varies notoriously both over time
and across regions) and, since the early 1990s, they have become harder to
obtain at older ages. In fact, and contrary to the practice prevailing during
the 1980s, it is now uncommon to access permanent DI beneﬁts after age
ﬁfty-ﬁve. This has mainly been achieved by extending the disability evalua-
tion process for the temporary illness program, Incapacidad Laboral Transi-
toria (see the appendix for a description), which, in the past, was most
often used as a bridge to retirement.
Both the unemployment and the disability plans oﬀer, as we will argue
momentarily, a pathway to early retirement alternate to the normal one
(with early retirement at sixty and normal retirement at sixty-ﬁve). Such al-
ternative pathways are taken in due account in our estimation and simula-
tion procedures.
The retirement program has two options: early retirement and normal
retirement. Early retirement is possible from age sixty, but it only applies
to workers who started their contributive career before 1967 (see note 1 and
recall that this privilege is soon to be extended also to workers who enrolled
after 1967). The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve, although some special
professions have lower normal retirement ages (miners, military personnel,
policemen, and ﬁshermen are the main ones). Collective wage settlements
often impose mandatory retirement at age sixty-ﬁve, facilitate retirement
at sixty-four with full beneﬁts, or encourage retirement between sixty and
sixty-three through lump-sum amounts.
9.2.2 Social Security Regimes and Their Rules
Under current legislation, public contributory pensions are provided by
the following programs.
• The general SS scheme, Régimen General de la Seguridad Social
(RGSS), and special SS schemes, Regímenes Especiales de la Seguri-
dad Social (RESS), cover all private-sector employees, self-employed
workers and professionals, members of cooperative ﬁrms, employees
of most public administrations, other than the central government, as
well as unemployed individuals who comply with the minimum num-
ber of contributory years when reaching sixty-ﬁve. The RESS include
ﬁve special schemes:
1. Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos (RETA) for the
self-employed.
2. Régimen Especial Agrario (REA) for agricultural workers and
small farmers.
3. Régimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar (REEH) for domes-
tic workers.
4. Régimen Especial de Trabajadores del Mar (RETM) for sailors.
5. Régimen Especial de la Minería del Carbón (REMC) for coal
miners.
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cludes public servants employed by the central government and its
local branches. In this study, we do not consider this regime. Summary
information about its structure and rules are reported later in this sec-
tion.
Legislation approved by Parliament in 1997 establishes the progressive
elimination of all the special regimes by the end of year 2001. Aside from
the pension scheme for public employees (RCP), the Spanish SS system
will then be structured around only two schemes for the private sector: one
for employees and one for the self-employed. It is not clear, at this point, if
such reform will be completed on time.4
9.2.3 The General Regime
This section describes the rules governing old age and survivors’ pen-
sions under the general scheme (RGSS) until 1997. The main changes in-
troduced by the 1997 reform will be illustrated as we go along. A summary
of the basic technical aspects of the pre- and post-1997 systems can be
found in table 9.3. Our focus on the RGSS is justiﬁed by the fact that this is
the main SS program in Spain and the benchmark for our simulations.
Financing and Eligibility
The RGSS is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme. Contributions are a ﬁxed pro-
portion of covered earnings (deﬁned as total earnings and excluding pay-
ments for overtime work) between a ﬂoor and a ceiling that vary for each of
the broadly deﬁned professional categories. Currently, eleven categories are
distinguished, each one with its covered-earnings ceiling and ﬂoor.
The current RGSS contribution rate is 28.3 percent, of which 23.6 per-
cent is attributed to the employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the em-
ployee. A tax rate of 14 percent is levied on earnings from overtime work.
Entitlement to an old age pension requires at least ﬁfteen years of con-
tributions. As a general rule, recipiency is conditional on having reached
age sixty-ﬁve and is incompatible with income from any kind of employ-
ment requiring aﬃliation to the SS system.
Beneﬁt Computation
If eligibility conditions are met, a worker retiring at age sixty-ﬁve re-
ceives an initial monthly pension P t equal to
P t    nBRt,
where the beneﬁt base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of
monthly covered earnings over a reference period that consists of the last
eight years before retirement:
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where W t–j and It–j indicate, respectively, earnings and the consumer price
index in the j-th month before retirement.
The replacement rate  n depends on the number of contributive years
and is equal to
 n   
It may be further adjusted in the case of early retirement as described later.
Starting from 1997, the number of reference years has been increased by
one every year until 2001 and should soon be increased further to ﬁfteen
years. Moreover, the formula for computing  nhas been changed to the fol-
lowing.
 n   
In all of our simulations we use the pre-1997 formula, which was in place
over the relevant sample period. We consider the impact of the 1997 reform
(R97) when examining alternative policies (see discussion of R97 in sec-
tion 9.7).
Outstanding pensions are fully indexed to price inﬂation, as measured
by the consumer price index. Until 1986, pensions were also indexed to real
wage growth.
Early Retirement
The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve, but early retirement at age sixty
is permitted for those who became aﬃliated to the SS before 1967. The cur-
rent legislation distinguishes between two cases. The ﬁrst one, representing
the vast majority of those currently retiring between age sixty and sixty-
ﬁve, is the case of workers who started contributing as dependent employ-
ees to some Mutualidad Laboral (Workers’ Mutual) before 1967. In this
case, the replacement rate is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year
under age sixty-ﬁve. Starting from 1997, workers who retire after the age of
sixty with forty or more contributive years are charged a penalty of only 7
percent for each year under age sixty-ﬁve.
The second case, representing about 10 percent of the early retirees, is
the case of workers with dangerous or unhealthy jobs (e.g., bullﬁghters,
employees of railroads, airlines and public transportation companies, and
so forth), or workers who were laid oﬀ for industrial restructuring regu-
if n   15
if 15   n   25
if 25   n   35
if 35   n.
0
.5   .03(n   15)
.8   .02(n   25)
1
if n   15
if 15   n   35
if 35   n.
0
.6   .02(n   15)
1
Micro-Modeling of Retirement Behavior in Spain 509lated by special legislation. In this case, no reduction applies. Notice that
these exemption rights are “portable” in the following sense: They apply to
individuals who were previously employed in one of the sectors deemed
dangerous or unhealthy, but the minimum retirement age without penalty
is proportional to the number of years of work spent in such sectors.
Unless there are collective agreements that prescribe mandatory retire-
ment, individuals may continue working after age sixty-ﬁve. In our empir-
ical work, we try to estimate the impact of such special arrangements.
Maximum and Minimum Pension
Pensions are subject to an annually legislated ceiling, roughly equal to
the ceiling on covered earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about 4.3
times the minimum wage (salario mínimo interprofesional;SMI) and about
1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and service
sectors. If the computed old age pension is below a minimum, then a per-
son is paid a annually legislated minimum pension. Other things being
equal, minimum pensions are higher for those who are older than sixty-ﬁve
or have a dependent spouse.
In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as
nominal wages, whereas maximum pensions grew at a lower rate that was
about equal to the inﬂation rate. The ratio between the minimum old age
pension and the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from the late
1970s (it was 75 percent in 1975) until reaching almost 100 percent in the
early 1990s. On the other hand, the percentage of pensioners of the RGSS
receiving a minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75 per-
cent in the late 1970s to 27 percent in 1995.
Family Considerations
A pensioner receives a ﬁxed annual allowance for each dependent child
that is younger than eighteen or disabled. In 2000, this allowance is equal
to PTA 48,420 for each child under eighteen and to PTA 468,720 (45 per-
cent of the annualized minimum wage) for each disabled child. In addition,
the minimum pension is increased by a ﬁxed amount if a pensioner has a
dependent spouse.
Survivors (spouses, children, or other relatives) may receive a fraction of
the beneﬁt base of the deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before
retirement after contributing for at least 500 days in the last ﬁve years. The
beneﬁt base is computed diﬀerently in the two cases. If the deceased was a
pensioner, the beneﬁt base coincides with the pension. If the deceased was
working, it is computed as an average of covered earnings over an uninter-
rupted period of two years chosen by the beneﬁciary from among the last
seven years immediately before death. If death occurred because of a work
accident or a professional illness, then the beneﬁt base coincides with the
last earnings.
510 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco PeracchiThe surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the beneﬁt base of the deceased.
In case of divorce, the pension is divided between the various spouses ac-
cording to the length of their marriage with the deceased. Such a pension
is compatible with labor income and any other old age or DI pension, but
is lost if the spouse remarries.
Surviving children get 20 percent each of the beneﬁt base of the princi-
pal as long as they are less than eighteen or unable to work and stay un-
married. An orphan who is a sole beneﬁciary may receive up to 65 percent
of the beneﬁt base. If there are several surviving children, the sum of the
pensions to the surviving spouse (if any) and children cannot exceed 100
percent of the beneﬁt base.
A Spanish peculiarity is the “pension in favor of family members.” This
pension entitles other surviving relatives (e.g., parents, grandparents, sib-
lings, nephews, and so forth) to 20 percent of the beneﬁt base of the prin-
cipal if they satisfy certain eligibility conditions (older than forty-ﬁve, do
not have a spouse, do not have other means of subsistence, and have been
living with and depending economically upon the deceased for the last two
years). To this pension, one may add the 45 percent survivors’ pension if
there is no surviving spouse or eligible surviving children.
9.2.4 Special Schemes
In this section, we sketch the main diﬀerences between the general and
the special schemes. Whereas rules and regulations for sailors and coal
miners are very similar to the ones for the general scheme, special rules
apply to self-employed, farmers, agricultural workers, domestic helpers,
and a few other categories not discussed here, such as part-time workers,
artists, traveling salespeople, and bullﬁghters. Beside diﬀerences in the SS
tax rate and the deﬁnition of covered earnings, an important diﬀerence is
the fact that those aﬃliated with the special schemes have no early retire-
ment option (although exception is made for miners and sailors).
The rest of this section focuses on the special schemes for self-employed
workers (RETA) and farmers (REA), which together represent 93 percent
of those aﬃliated with the special schemes and 86 percent of the pensions
that are paid out.
Self-Employed
While the SS tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general scheme
(28.3 percent in 2000), covered earnings are computed diﬀerently, as the
self-employed are essentially free to choose their covered earnings between
a ﬂoor and a annually legislated ceiling. Not surprisingly in the light of the
strong progressivity of Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously large
proportion of self-employed workers report earnings equal to the legislated
ﬂoor.
In 2000, the ﬂoor and the ceiling were equal to PTA 116,160 and PTA
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and 5 times the minimum wage, and 0.5 and 1.9 times the average earnings
in manufacturing and services. For a self-employed aged ﬁfty and older, the
ceiling was only about half—PTA 219,000 per month—which was about
equal to the average monthly earnings.
A crucial diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is that, under the
RETA, recipiency of an old age pension is compatible with maintaining
the self-employed status. The implications of this provision for the retire-
ment behavior of self-employed workers are discussed later.
Some other important provisions are the following. In order to qualify
for survivors’ pensions, RETA only requires at least ﬁve years of contribu-
tion in the ten years immediately before the death of the principal. Under
RETA, the latter is 50 percent of the beneﬁt base. If the principal was not
a pensioner at time of death, the beneﬁt base is computed as the average of
covered earnings over an uninterrupted period of ﬁve years chosen by the
beneﬁciary among the last ten years before the death of the principal.
Farmers
In this case, both the SS tax rate and the covered earnings diﬀer with re-
spect to the general scheme. Self-employed farmers pay 19.75 percent of a
tax base that is legislated annually and is unrelated to actual earnings. In
2000, this is equal to PTA 91,740 per month, corresponding to 1.24 times
the minimum wage and about 40 percent of the average monthly earnings
in the manufacturing and service sectors.
Farm employees, instead, pay 11.5 percent of a monthly base that de-
pends on their professional category and is legislated yearly. In addition,
for each day of work, their employer must pay 15.5 percent of a daily base
that also varies by professional category and is legislated annually.
9.2.5 Government Employees
We  now describe brieﬂy the main diﬀerences between the general
scheme and the RCP, the pension fund for the employees of the central gov-
ernment.
Public servants are divided into ﬁve categories, labeled from (a) to (e),
corresponding loosely to decreasing schooling levels: (a) for college grad-
uates (doctor, licenciado, arquitecto o equivalente), (b) for people holding
certain kinds of college diplomas (ingeniero técnico, diplomado, and so
forth), (c) for high school graduates (bachiller o equivalente), (d) for junior
high school diplomas (graduado escolar o equivalente), and (e) for individ-
uals with lower education levels (certiﬁcad o de escolaridad). For each of
these categories, the budget law deﬁnes every year a theoretical SS wage
(haber regulador), which is used to compute SS contributions and pen-
sions. The implied wage scale has remained relatively constant since 1985.
The top to bottom ratio never exceeded 2.5.
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tional to the legislated covered wage, according to proportionality factors
legislated annually: (a) derechos pasivos (currently 3.86 percent), (b) cuota
mensual de mutualidades (monthly mutual premium; 1.89 percent), and (c)
aportacíon del estado (paid by the government, it varies between 6 and 10
percent depending on the sector of the administration). To parallel this
three-part contribution structure, actual pensions are computed by adding
up three sources of beneﬁts: (a) the basic pension (derechos pasivos), (b) a
portion directed to the pensioner’s family (ayuda familiar), and (c) a com-
plementary portion coming from the various mutualidades—Instituto
Sociale de las Fuerzas Armadas (ISFAS), Mutualidad Funcianarios de la
Administración Central del Estado (MUFACE), and Mutualidad general
de Empleados de la administración Judicial (MUGEJU).
The basic monthly pension of a public servant who retires in month taf-
ter contributing for n years to RCP is computed as P t    nBRt, where the
dependence of  n upon the numbers of years worked has changed fre-
quently over time. For n   15, the last table of proportionality factors, leg-
islated in 1990, can be reasonably (but not exactly) approximated by
 n   min[1, 1   .0366(35   n)].
The diﬀerences with respect to the general scheme are various. First,
while the entitlement to a pension still requires at least ﬁfteen years of con-
tributions, the replacement rate (the ratio of the pension to the beneﬁt
base) increases somewhat irregularly with seniority, up to 100 percent af-
ter thirty-ﬁve years. So, for example, ﬁfteen years of service gives pension
rights equal to only 26.92 percent of the beneﬁt base, against 60 percent of
the general scheme. After thirty years the same ratio has increased to 81.73
percent, against 90 percent for the general scheme.
Second, the beneﬁt base is computed as a weighted average of covered
earnings (to which the worker paid contributions) with weights equal to the




where pi is the fraction of the career spent on level i and Hit are the covered
earnings corresponding to level i, as determined by the current law at
time t.
Third, unlike the general scheme, the RCP imposes mandatory retire-
ment at age sixty-ﬁve. Exceptions are made for a few special categories,
such as university professors and judges. On the other hand, the RCP al-
lows for early retirement at the age of sixty, without any penalty for public
servants with at least thirty years of service (twenty years for military per-
sonnel).
A fourth important diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is com-
patibility between RCP pensions receipt and income from continued work.
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sector occupation, as long as this does not provide them with a regular ﬂow
of income (for example, the case of members of legislative bodies). More
importantly, the legislation allows RCP pensions to be cumulated with
earnings from employment in the private sector.
When a public servant is dismissed because of disability (and therefore
starts drawing a DI pension) or dies (and the survivors are therefore enti-
tled to a pension), the missing years between the person’s age at death and
sixty-ﬁve are counted as actual years of service in the computation of ei-
ther the DI or the survivors’ pension. Should the disability be caused by an
accident while on duty, the DI pension is doubled.
9.2.6 Pathways to Retirement
This brief illustration of the public pension system clariﬁes that more
than one pathway to retirement is available to Spanish workers. We have
identiﬁed four of them in more detail: early retirement, normal retirement,
temporary illness or disability and the UB program (speciﬁcally, UB52 ).
In table 9.4 we provide a brief listing of which programs are available ac-
cording to the SS regime in which one is enrolled.
9.3 Data Description
9.3.1 The Main Data Set
Our main micro-economic data set is based on administrative records
from the Spanish SS administration (Historiales Laborales de la Seguridad
Social; HLSS). The sample consists of 250,000 individual work histories
randomly drawn from the historical ﬁles of SS aﬃliates (Fichero Histórico
de Aﬁliados; FHA). The sample includes only individuals aged forty and
older on 31 July 1998, the date at which the ﬁles were prepared. The sample
contains individuals from the RGSS and the ﬁve special regimes—RETA,
REA, REEH, RTMC and RTMAR. As we mentioned above, civil servants
and other central government employees are not covered by the SS admin-
istration and are not considered in this study.
The data set consists of three ﬁles. The ﬁrst ﬁle, the “history ﬁle” (H ﬁle),
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Table 9.4 Pathways to Retirement
RGSS and RCP
Pathway Assimilates RETA (Public Employees)
1. NR at 65 ✓✓ ✓
2. ER at 60 ✓✓ ✓ (Without penalty with 35 years service)
3. UB then ER ✓ Not relevant
4. ER through DI ✓✓ ✓
Note: See text for explanation of abbreviations.contains the work history of the individuals in the sample. Each record in
this ﬁle describes a single employment spell of the individual. As we argue
later, the work histories are very accurate for employment spells that began
after the mid-1960s. The second ﬁle, the “covered earnings ﬁle” (CE ﬁle),
contains annual averages of covered earnings (bases de cotización) from
1986 to 1995. The third ﬁle, the “beneﬁts ﬁle” (B ﬁle), contains information
on the lifetime SS beneﬁts received by the individuals in the sample. Bene-
ﬁts are classiﬁed by function (retirement, disability, survival, and so forth)
and initial amount received. To be more precise, the B ﬁle contains the ini-
tial beneﬁt amount and the length of the period during which the beneﬁt
was received. A fourth ﬁle, the “relatives ﬁle” (R ﬁle), is also available; it re-
ports some beneﬁts paid to relatives who were members of the individual’s
household.
For each individual in the sample who contributed to SS during the
1986–1995 period, the CE ﬁle reports the annual average of covered earn-
ings together with the contributions paid. For individuals enrolled in either
the RGSS or the RTMC, covered earnings are a version of earnings that are
doubly censored (from above and below). What this means is that covered
earnings have both ceilings and ﬂoors: Contributions must be paid over
some legislated minimum wage, no matter what actual earnings are. Fur-
thermore, earnings above certain legislated ceilings are not covered; that is,
they do not generate any future right and, as such, are not reported in the
SS administration ﬁles. Notice, although, that they are taxed for contribu-
tions, which matter for retirement incentives. For people enrolled in SS
regimes other than RGSS and RTMC, covered earnings are chosen by the
individual within given ceilings and ﬂoors (see section 9.2 for details) and,
consequently, there is no clear link between covered and actual earnings in
this case.
For each employment spell in the H ﬁle, we know age, sex, and marital
status of the person, the duration of the spell (in days), the type of contract
(in particular, we can distinguish between part-time and full-time con-
tracts), the social security regime, the contributive group, the cause for the
termination of the spell, the sector of employment (four-digit standard in-
dustrial classiﬁcation [SIC]), and the region of residence (ﬁfty-two Spanish
provinces). For each individual in the H ﬁle who has received some ben-
eﬁts at any point in time, we know most of the information that the SS
administration uses to compute the monthly beneﬁts to be paid. In partic-
ular, we know the initial and current pension, the beneﬁt base (base regu-
ladora), the number of contributive years, the current integration toward
the minimum pension (complementos por el mínimo), the date pension was
claimed, the date it was awarded, the type of beneﬁts, and so on.
We refer to Martínez (1999) for a detailed description of the variables
and for summary statistics of the history, covered earnings, and beneﬁts
ﬁles. The distribution of the HLSS sample, by activity, regime and status of
the individuals therein recorded is summarized in table 9.5.
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Activity Status
Died
Age and Working Working Not Temporary While Out
Gender Full-Time Part-Time Working Illness Active of LF Total
All the Regimes
Male
50–54 72.74 0.99 4.16 1.79 1.82 18.50 20794
55–59 69.76 0.52 2.89 1.49 2.49 22.85 20878
60–65 39.72 0.31 1.23 1.51 3.54 53.68 22813
65–69 5.22 0.07 0.21 1.80 4.12 88.58 19304
Female
50–54 57.56 5.54 3.51 3.85 0.58 28.95 12409
55–59 56.32 4.21 2.40 4.01 0.85 32.21 9385
60–65 45.72 2.45 1.22 3.12 1.44 46.05 9237
65–69 12.97 0.48 0.28 2.69 1.53 82.06 7142
RGSS
Male
50–54 71.47 1.44 4.80 2.50 1.67 18.13 14222
55–59 68.73 0.78 3.49 2.02 2.32 22.66 13887
60–65 35.78 0.49 1.61 2.08 3.16 56.88 14327
65–69 3.10 0.13 0.27 2.60 3.90 90.00 11127
Female
50–54 46.41 10.47 4.96 7.00 0.66 30.51 6555
55–59 46.07 8.94 3.35 7.63 0.95 33.05 4417
60–65 34.88 5.85 2.02 6.24 1.16 49.86 3865
65–69 6.54 1.30 0.27 6.27 1.26 84.37 2616
RETA
Male
50–54 77.21 — 3.05 0.11 1.38 18.25 3770
55–59 72.72 — 2.21 0.09 2.64 22.34 3442
60–65 52.23 — 1.17 0.22 4.68 41.70 3163
65–69 8.03 — 0.24 0.00 5.27 86.46 2466
Female
50–54 60.08 — 3.00 0.11 0.37 36.43 2698
55–59 53.99 — 2.47 0.43 0.66 42.45 2106
60–65 45.39 — 0.91 0.40 1.82 51.47 1976
65–69 15.24 — 0.53 0.07 1.72 82.44 1509
RETA
Male
50–54 58.80 0.62 34.13 0.00 0.34 6.11 3847
55–59 40.02 0.25 49.43 0.00 2.43 7.86 4770
60–65 15.32 0.15 22.59 8.27 46.71 6.97 12246
65–69 10.31 0.06 0.09 20.15 62.11 7.29 17100
Female
50–54 80.68 5.12 11.72 0.00 0.03 2.45 3593
55–59 66.66 8.34 20.64 0.00 0.36 4.00 3023
60–65 41.02 10.04 21.77 7.45 14.81 4.91 4254
65–69 21.28 6.98 0.14 22.97 44.36 4.28 58619.3.2 Data Problems in Historiales Laborales
de la Seguridad Social (HLSS)
We face several problems with the HLSS ﬁles, most of which are inher-
ent to the structure of the Spanish SS record-keeping procedures. We shall
illustrate some of the problems we encountered by comparing sample sta-
tistics from the HLSS with those obtained from other data sources that are,
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Table 9.5 (continued)
Beneﬁts (as a fraction of people out of the LF)
Without Retirement Died
SS After While
Beneﬁts Survival DI DI Retirement Receiving Total
All the Regimes
Male
50–54 58.80 0.62 34.13 0.00 0.34 6.11 3847
55–59 40.02 0.25 49.43 0.00 2.43 7.86 4770
60–65 15.32 0.15 22.59 8.27 46.71 6.97 12246
65–69 10.31 0.06 0.09 20.15 62.11 7.29 17100
Female
50–54 80.68 5.12 11.72 0.00 0.03 2.45 3593
55–59 66.66 8.34 20.64 0.00 0.36 4.00 3023
60–65 41.02 10.04 21.77 7.45 14.81 4.91 4254
65–69 21.28 6.98 0.14 22.97 44.36 4.28 5861
RGSS
Male
50–54 56.25 0.74 35.61 0.00 0.19 7.21 2578
55–59 40.48 0.29 47.63 0.00 3.18 8.42 3147
60–65 14.48 0.11 19.45 6.87 51.74 7.35 8149
65–69 10.66 0.06 0.12 17.39 64.20 7.58 10059
Female
50–54 81.70 5.30 10.10 0.00 0.05 2.85 2000
55–59 67.81 9.38 17.19 0.00 0.68 4.93 1460
60–65 39.91 10.02 16.97 5.35 21.90 5.86 1927
65–69 23.02 7.16 0.09 17.72 47.30 4.71 2207
RETA
Male
50–54 72.82 0.73 23.29 0.00 0.15 3.05 688
55–59 52.28 0.26 42.13 0.00 0.91 4.42 769
60–65 26.91 0.45 26.91 9.40 31.24 5.08 1319
65–69 12.90 0.14 0.09 18.15 62.24 6.47 2132
Female
50–54 86.78 4.48 7.53 0.00 0.00 1.22 983
55–59 78.64 7.72 12.75 0.00 0.00 0.89 894
60–65 57.23 12.29 14.85 4.42 8.85 2.36 1017
65–69 31.67 10.29 0.08 14.95 39.07 3.94 1244
Note: Dashes indicate that data is not relevant.presumably, more representative of the working population under study, at
least along the dimensions considered here.
• Overrepresentation of some regions or sectors: The proportion of indi-
viduals from some geographical regions or industrial sectors is much
larger in our ﬁle than in either the census or the EPA labor force sur-
vey. Carrying out inference conditional on region and industrial sec-
tor is therefore essential.
• Mortality data: We have limited information on mortality. In prin-
ciple, information for those who are active is good enough in the sense
that the data report whether or not a person is alive or dead and, if
dead, when the event occurred. However, information for the retirees
is incomplete, since we only know whether a person is still alive at the
reference date (31 July 1998). In other words, for those in the B ﬁle, we
know if they stopped receiving beneﬁts because of death before 31 July
1998, but not the exact date when this happened.
• Left-censored histories: Early spells (those which started before the
mid-1960s) are very poorly recorded because the current structure of
the Spanish SS administration was set up only in the second half of the
1960s. Hence, we have incomplete records of the work histories of in-
dividuals older than ﬁfty-ﬁve or sixty. This is a major problem for our
computation of expected pensions, since the current system estab-
lishes a clear formula to impute years of contribution before 1967,
speciﬁcally,
IDC   [1967   (yb   210)]   250,
where IDC stands for imputed days of contribution, and yb stands for
the year of birth. For each individual, the IDC is then compared with
the actual days of contribution before 1967 as reported in the H ﬁle.
The largest of these quantities is chosen as the individual’s contribu-
tive history before 1967.
• Marital status: This variable is very poorly recorded, especially for in-
dividuals who are still active. The reason is that marital status does not
aﬀect contribution rates but may aﬀect SS beneﬁts. Hence, individu-
als have no incentive to adjust their records while active. They do so
only when pressured, which is not frequent, or when they change jobs.
Most often, people adjust their marital status in the SS records at the
time of retirement in order to draw beneﬁts for the spouse. Informa-
tion on marital status is therefore incorrect for many individuals (in
1997, only 27.50 and 10.31 percent of men and women, respectively,
report to be married). To ﬁll in the gap we use the EPA. From this sur-
vey, we can extract the following information:
1. Working men are married with women three years younger,
whereas working women are married with men four years older.
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ing males who are married, from EPA, is 95.10, 94.6, and 92.7 percent
for males aged ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four, ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine, and sixty to
sixty-four, respectively. Female workers are less likely to be married
(between 60 and 70 percent) and more likely to be widowed (between
10 and 20 percent), depending on the level of education.
3. For low-educated male workers ﬁfty-ﬁve and older, the fraction
of working spouses is very low (less than 15 percent) and decreases
with age; whereas for highly educated male workers, the fraction of
working spouses is much higher (35 percent).
4. For low-educated female workers ﬁfty-ﬁve and older, the frac-
tion of working spouses is low (less than 35 percent for age group ﬁfty-
ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine and 25 percent for the age group sixty to sixty-four.
For highly educated female workers, the fraction of working spouses
is also much higher (45 percent and 30 percent, respectively, for the age
groups ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine and sixty to sixty-four).
• Family data: There is no information on family size or its structure.
The Spanish SS simply does not keep this kind of records because fam-
ily size does not aﬀect either contribution rates (like marital status) or
pensions (as marital status does).
9.3.3 Sample Selection Rules
We distinguish between a “wage sample,” used to study earnings dy-
namics, and a “participation sample,” used to study labor force participa-
tion and exit into retirement. In either case, the analysis is carried out sep-
arately for men and women born between 1916 and 1958 (about 160,000
men and 84,000 women). In ﬁgure 9.2, we show the distribution of the
sample by sex and year of birth. Note the upward jump between 1918 and
1919 and the reduction during 1938 and 1939 followed by a spike in 1940,
which was a direct consequence of the Spanish Civil War.
While we place practically no restrictions on the H-ﬁle derived partici-
pation sample, which covers all the Spanish SS regimes (see table 9.6 for a
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Table 9.6 Distribution of the Participation Sample, by Regime
Year RGSS RETA REA RTMAR RTMC REEH N
1985 59.66 15.98 18.48 2.97 0.07 2.87 213,238
1989 61.36 16.97 16.24 3.08 0.07 2.28 196,254
1993 63.43 17.01 14.32 3.40 0.07 1.77 168,560
1997 62.00 17.58 14.93 3.90 0.08 1.51 132,587
Notes: N = number of observations. See text for explanation of abbreviations.
description of the sample distribution by regime), the CE-ﬁle wage sample
is restricted to individuals in the RGSS, the RTMC, or RETA. We have ex-
cluded individuals enrolled in the REA, RTMAR, or REEH because of
their discontinuous careers and very low reliability of the earnings reported.
9.3.4 Key Elements in Data Handling
Deﬁnition of Retirement
In any given year t, being retired can be characterized by a number of
diﬀerent events. Correspondingly, we have the following four diﬀerent def-
initions of retirement, of which the ﬁrst is the broadest, while the others
cannot be directly compared.
1. Not having an open spell after year t
2. In addition to 1, not contributing in years t   k, k   0
3. In addition to 1, a retirement recorded in the entry “cause of termi-
nation of the spell”
4. In addition to 1, a retirement or termination by temporary illness
recorded in the entry “cause of termination of the spell”
In our sample, we obtain practically the same fraction of retired people
under either deﬁnition 1 or 2. More precisely, 99.15 percent of males retired
under deﬁnition 1 are also retired under deﬁnition 2. Likewise, 96.01 per-
cent of females retired under deﬁnition 1 are retired under deﬁnition 2. The
deﬁnitions using the cause for the termination of the last employment spell
(either deﬁnitions 3 or 4) are much stricter and probably too much so. Only
a fraction of those considered retired under deﬁnition 1 are as such under
either deﬁnitions 3 or 4 (48.82 and 30.82 of the male and female sample, re-
spectively). This lack of coincidence is sharply reduced when considering
individuals aged sixty to sixty-four, but is still very important (well above 40
percent in both cases). Most likely, this large discrepancy is due to omission
of the cause for termination of spell and does not reﬂect a diﬀerent status.
A number of other technical details should be kept in mind.
1. Eligibility: The early retirement age in Spain is sixty (see section 9.2
for a description of restrictions and related penalties). Some exceptions arestill possible at age ﬁfty-eight for workers of distressed ﬁrms. We can fol-
low individuals from either age or even earlier when appropriate.
2. Transition from unemployment to retirement: This is an option open to
workers older than ﬁfty-two who are eligible for a special kind of UB. This
special kind of UB is not reported in the current version of our data set.
Still, we need to consider that, for individuals older than ﬁfty-two, this is a
possible path to retirement. In particular, we must decide whether or not
unemployed people older than ﬁfty-two should be considered in or out of
the labor force. In this work, we have decided that a worker is in the labor
force as long as they are contributing to the SS administration.
3. Transition to and from disability: These transitions are hard to cap-
ture using the available data. Considerations similar to those developed for
the case of transition from unemployment apply to working histories in-
volving disability or long-term illness. In order to classify people, we follow
the criteria just outlined for those unemployed: A worker in the temporary
illness program is in the labor force as long as they keep contributing to
the SS.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Our sample reports information on age, sex, contributive group (from
which we can extract a proxy of the level of education), marital status (very
imprecise, as mentioned earlier), sector of employment (four-digit SIC
classiﬁcation), and province of residence. Other available information is
part-time work and length of tenure in the current job and in the labor
market.
Education and Participation (RGSS)
No direct measure of educational attainment is available. For individu-
als enrolled in the RGSS, a good proxy for the level of education may be
constructed using the information on the contributive group of the subject
since, for these workers, a variety of labor market regulations force a close
relationship between educational level and contributive group.
The criteria we adopted are the following. All individuals in contributive
group 1 were assigned to the college level of the educational variable. Indi-
viduals in contributive groups 2, 3, and 4 were assigned to the high school
(diploma) level. People in all other contributive groups were assigned to a
generic class labeled as “less than high school.”
Table 9.7compares the resulting distribution of educational levels in the
HLSS sample in 1997 with the corresponding distribution obtained from
the EPA, which reports educational levels directly. Results are mixed. If we
take the EPA as a correct estimate of the population distribution, then our
sample overestimates the number of educated men (summing together
those at the college and diploma levels) and underestimate the proportion
of educated women. This is not altogether surprising. We are inferring the
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siﬁed for contributive purposes. The Spanish labor market is notoriously
characterized by a substantial amount of discrimination by sex. This forces
a large fraction of working women into occupational proﬁles lower than
those of men with similar educational attainment and qualiﬁcation. Vari-
ous empirical studies have documented this fact, which is clearly reﬂected
also in the SS administrative records that we use.
The bottom panels of ﬁgure 9.3 show the pattern of participation by ed-
ucational level and age for individuals enrolled in the RGSS. The large
variations in the participation rate of women with either a college degree
or a diploma at ages higher than ﬁfty should be interpreted as noise gener-
ated by the very limited number of observations available for female in
those age groups.
The table conﬁrms the well-documented ﬁnding that, for both men and
women, higher education is associated with higher participation rates in
general and at older ages, in particular. Notice also how retirement pat-
terns for individuals with high education are much more sharply deﬁned:
Hazard rates before the normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve are lower than
for the rest of the labor force, while they become much higher at the nor-
mal retirement age.
Economic Characteristics of the Sample
In table 9.8 we show, for selected years, the sample distribution by con-
tributive groups of workers enrolled in the RGSS and the RTMC. As men-
tioned earlier, the contributive group may be regarded as a combination
of education, skills, and type of contract. The distribution by contributive
groups in our sample seems quite stable over the whole period, except for
blue-collars. The fraction of skilled blue-collars increases (from 21.6 to
25.4 percent), whereas the fraction of semiskilled and unskilled decreases.
These ﬁndings reﬂect accepted modiﬁcations in the skill distribution of the
Spanish labor force over the sample period.
Table 9.9 shows the sample distribution of workers in the RGSS by broad
industry categorization (1-digit SIC classiﬁcation). For both men and
522 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi
Table 9.7 Distribution by Education in HLSS and EPA in 1997 (employed
individuals, born 1916–58, enrolled in the RGSS)
HLSS Sample EPA IV
Education Male Female Total Male Female Total
College 9.55 6.38 8.58 7.99 7.48 7.82
Diploma 10.18 10.51 10.28 6.81 14.27 9.22
Other 80.27 83.11 81.13 85.20 78.25 82.96














































































































































sTable 9.9 Sample Distribution in 1985 and 1997, by Sector (RGSS and RTMC)
1985 1997
Sector Male Female Total Male Female Total
Agriculture, ﬁshing 0.32 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.16 0.23
Energy 2.29 0.50 1.79 1.99 0.34 1.51
Minerals, chemical 7.12 1.75 5.61 4.78 1.25 3.75
Mechanical, engineering 10.52 2.29 8.21 6.94 1.54 5.36
Other manufacturing 11.19 8.58 10.46 7.67 5.32 6.98
Industry
Construction 11.35 1.93 8.71 10.30 1.18 7.63
Retail 14.65 19.51 16.01 13.50 15.99 14.23
Transportation 7.15 2.81 5.93 7.15 2.71 5.85
Communication and ﬁnancial 8.16 6.72 7.75 8.26 7.14 7.94
Other services 6.08 16.37 8.97 9.19 24.85 13.74
Administration 8.92 23.74 13.08 10.23 20.47 13.23
Code 9130 2.76 5.17 3.44 9.89 10.03 9.93
Temporary illness 8.66 8.97 8.75 8.10 8.01 8.08
Other (Codes 0000 & 9990) 0.79 1.42 0.97 1.75 1.00 1.54
Total 69,682 27,219 96,901 53,134 22,006 75,140
Table 9.8 Distribution of the RGSS Plus the RTMC Sample, by Group
of Contribution
Year
Group of Contribution 1985 1989 1993 1997
White-collar
1. Engineer and College 6.08 7.10 7.75 7.75
2. Technical engineer 4.34 4.68 5.11 5.87
3. Supervisor and foreman 3.97 4.53 5.13 5.36
4. Assistant without grade 3.39 3.70 3.91 4.09
5. Clerk 9.35 9.68 10.13 10.70
6. Janitor 5.73 5.87 6.21 6.70
7. Clerk assistant 7.04 6.58 6.67 7.08
Blue-collar
8. Skilled (1st and 2nd class) 21.57 24.05 24.89 25.42
9. Semiskilled (3rd and specialized) 14.43 12.97 11.43 10.26
10. Unskilled 20.83 20.13 18.50 16.58
11. Worker (17 yrs old) 0.29 0.16 0.09 0.04
12. Worker (16 yrs old) 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.00
13. Other 2.81 0.38 0.17 0.16
Total 127,356 120,568 107,032 82,313women, the most important sector of employment is administration and
other services, followed by retail services. Note also the important fraction
of men in a condition of temporary illness. We do not report the distribu-
tion for individuals enrolled in the RESS (RETA, REA, or REEH) be-
cause the data set does not indicate the industry in which they should be
classiﬁed.
In table 9.10, we present the average length of the last spell of work (a
good proxy for the length of tenure with the current ﬁrm) and the average
work history (a good proxy for labor market tenure). Notice that both mea-
sures remain fairly stable during the sample period and that, for obvious
reasons, work spells with a ﬁrm are much longer for self-employed than for
employees. Both ﬁrm and market tenures are much longer for men than for
women.
9.4 Earnings Distribution, Earnings Histories, and Projections
As commented in section 9.3.1, we do not observe earnings directly, but
instead only use covered earnings. Covered earnings are a doubly censored
version of earnings for workers in the RGSS or RTMC, and they are very
weakly related to true earnings for workers in the RESS because of the
presence of both legislated tariﬀs and widespread tax fraud.
9.4.1 RGSS and RTMC
In ﬁgure 9.4 we present the distribution of the log of real covered earn-
ings for workers enrolled in the RGSS or RTMC for the years 1986 (top
panels) and 1995 (bottom panels), respectively. We distinguish by sex and
report only two contributive groups (1 and 8). Two patterns arise. First, the
increase over time in the fraction of top-censored observations for both
the ﬁrst (workers with college degrees) and the eighth (skilled workers)
contributive group. For both men and women, the increase is quite pro-
nounced for the ﬁrst group, which corresponds to the highest wages. In the
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Table 9.10 Length of Firm and Market Tenure, by Years
All SS Regimes RGSS and RTMC
Spell Experience Spell Experience
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1985 8.3 5.0 16.3 8.1 6.5 4.7 16.7 10.1
1988 7.7 4.8 16.0 8.1 5.9 4.4 16.2 9.9
1991 7.4 4.6 15.9 7.9 5.7 4.2 16.2 9.7
1994 7.2 4.5 15.8 7.9 5.9 4.4 16.2 9.9
1997 6.8 4.4 15.3 7.9 5.8 4.5 15.9 10.1






































































































































































































5other group, which corresponds to median and below-median wages, it is
relevant only for men and not for women. This asymmetry suggests that the
gender bias characterizing the Spanish labor market is actually weaker or
weakening in the top segments of the wage distribution but is still quite
strong in the lower ones. The presence of increasing top censoring is also
evidence of the inability of legislated ceilings to keep up with real wage dy-
namics: Ceilings on covered earnings are adjusted only to price inﬂation
and do not track growth in real wages. The second important observation
is that bottom censoring also increases in the eighth contributive group for
both men and women, which is quite surprising. This suggests that the
wage distribution has become more spread out over time. Notice that the
Spanish government has also followed the policy of progressively reducing
the relative size of the ﬂoor-to-ceiling bands by increasing the ﬂoor faster
than the ceiling, which helps explaining the increasing number of bottom-
censored individuals.
Overall the evidence reported suggests that we should invest a consider-
able eﬀort in recovering true earnings from covered earnings for people en-
rolled in the RGSS or RTMC. Also, given the purpose for which we need
to uncover true earnings, eliminating the eﬀect of top censoring is the im-
portant goal. In our analysis, true earnings are used to project or forecast
future wages for workers (sixty-ﬁve years or older) that are making the
choice between retiring and continuing to work. In any given contributive
group, it is most unlikely that such workers would be at the bottom of the
wage distribution and would look forward to an ever-decreasing salary if
they kept working. Both, the skill-acquisition process and the existence of
seniority pay (still important in Spain) suggest that old workers should be
found in the upper tail of the distribution of salaries.
This intuition is conﬁrmed, but only partially, by the data. In table 9.11,
we report the percentage of workers, men or women, that are forty or older
and are either at the bottom or at the top of the distribution of covered
earnings for each one of the ten contributive groups. As expected, the fre-
quency of observations in the bottom-censored groups is substantially
lower than at the top-censored groups. Still, it is higher than one would ex-
pect, especially for people in the contributive groups with lower salaries (7
and higher-index numbers), and it does not seem to decrease with age.
These anomalies in the data notwithstanding, we ﬁnd it rather unlikely for
the near retirees to be found in any signiﬁcant proportion at the bottom of
the distribution of wages and looking forward to further decreases in the
wage itself. Hence, we have elected not to bother getting rid of the bottom
censoring and to concentrate on the top-censoring problem.
To deal with the top-censoring problem, we proceed as follows. First we
estimate a tobit model for covered earnings. Then we use the estimated pa-
rameters to impute the earnings of the censored observations and estimate
an earning function using imputed earnings for those aﬀected by the ceil-
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ings. Finally, we generate “true earnings” for all the individuals in the top-
censored groups by using the estimated regression function and adding an
individual random noise component. The ﬁrst two steps of the above pro-
cedure are detailed in the appendix, the latter is described in section 9.4.1.
From the individual proﬁle of covered earnings ctbetween year T– kand
year T, we impute the individual proﬁle of real true earnings (wt, t   T – k,
...  ,  T). Given this information, we project earnings forward and back-
ward in the following way:
• Forward: (zero real growth) w ˆT m   w ˆt for m   1, . . . , M;
• Backward: w ˆT–k–    wT–k   g(aT–k) for     1, . . . , L. The function g( )
corrects for the growth of earnings imputable to age aand is deﬁned as
g(aT k  )    1   aT k      2   a2
T k      1   aT k    2   a2
T k.
The   s are the estimated coeﬃcients from a ﬁxed-eﬀects earnings
equation, the details of which are available upon request. The correc-
tion is speciﬁc for each combination of sex and contributive group.
Table 9.11 Relevance of Floors and Ceilings in Covered Earnings (RGSS, RTMC, and RETA)
1986
Male Female
Group Censored 40–54 55–59 60–64 65+ Total 40–54 55–59 60–64 65+ Total
RGSS and RTMC
1B 5.5 5.0 5.4 19.4 5.6 9.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 8.5
A 37.9 33.2 30.4 25.8 36.6 14.6 5.6 13.3 0.0 13.8
2B 1.4 4.1 3.3 9.5 1.9 3.1 6.5 5.3 0.0 3.6
A 37.8 22.1 21.3 9.5 34.8 4.8 4.8 0.0 11.1 4.6
3B 1.2 1.6 1.9 4.8 1.3 5.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 4.7
A 34.8 32.3 25.0 14.3 33.5 18.2 10.5 10.0 25.0 17.1
4B 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.7 1.8 7.1 0.0 — 2.3
A 34.1 20.3 19.7 13.3 31.3 14.5 0.0 12.5 — 12.9
5B 1.2 2.2 0.4 0.0 1.3 3.2 2.7 4.0 0.0 3.2
A 37.0 36.1 30.0 22.9 36.3 22.2 20.5 12.0 33.3 21.7
6B 2.8 2.8 3.1 10.2 3.0 6.9 9.8 11.6 0.0 7.7
A 17.6 12.8 8.2 6.8 14.8 3.1 2.5 5.8 11.1 3.3
7B 8.6 10.5 10.3 5.6 8.9 9.1 12.3 3.1 100. 9.2
A 25.2 18.8 10.3 5.6 22.6 12.1 7.0 3.1 0.0 10.9
8B 3.2 3.3 2.2 2.9 3.1 5.1 9.3 3.8 0.0 5.7
A 13.2 15.1 10.8 0.0 13.3 4.4 2.8 1.9 0.0 3.9
9B 2.3 2.8 3.1 17.1 2.5 15.8 13.2 13.5 11.1 15.3
A 14.8 11.2 8.9 0.0 13.8 3.8 3.6 1.9 0.0 3.6
10 B 12.7 16.5 10.1 21.7 13.3 24.3 19.9 22.9 39.3 23.5
A 9.6 4.9 6.0 8.3 8.2 3.1 2.2 0.9 0.0 2.7
RETA
B 93.2 90.8 83.8 83.6 91.6 97.6 96.3 93.3 93.6 96.5
A 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.09.4.2 RESS
As already pointed out, for individuals enrolled in the RESS, covered
earnings are very weakly related to true earnings. In particular, the self-
employed are free to choose their beneﬁt base between an annual ﬂoor and
a ceiling. Practically all of them choose the ﬂoor, as conﬁrmed by table
9.11, which displays the fraction of self-employed contributing the mini-
mum (censored from below) or the maximum (censored from above) for
the years 1986 and 1995, respectively. This implies that there is no way in
which true earnings for the self-employed can be recovered from the HLSS
data set. We have therefore assumed that the earnings and the contributive
proﬁle coincide.5 Thus, we project (real) earnings given the observed pro-
ﬁle of (real) contributions.




Group Censored 40–54 55–59 60–64 65+ Total 40–54 55–59 60–64 65+ Total
RGSS and RTMC
1B 3.8 3.7 4.0 7.8 3.9 9.6 7.2 8.0 0.0 9.2
A 54.6 54.2 48.1 39.2 53.5 31.7 39.1 44.0 15.4 32.6
2B 2.8 4.9 4.1 3.0 3.2 3.8 5.5 5.3 17.6 4.2
A 36.9 39.1 25.1 18.2 36.0 5.2 5.5 7.4 0.0 5.3
3B 3.0 6.0 5.5 6.8 3.9 4.3 8.9 7.7 12.5 5.2
A 33.6 29.1 20.9 25.0 31.4 14.4 8.9 0.0 12.5 12.8
4B 2.6 8.4 7.7 15.2 4.4 16.1 9.1 18.2 16.7 15.4
A 20.5 15.4 11.6 12.1 18.5 5.9 5.5 9.1 0.0 6.0
5B 4.4 9.6 6.2 8.7 5.5 12.5 15.0 16.3 16.0 13.0
A 35.1 29.9 23.5 11.6 32.7 19.8 13.1 14.1 4.0 18.5
6B 5.0 9.0 6.2 5.8 6.1 11.4 14.6 11.8 13.5 11.9
A 18.6 11.7 4.8 4.3 14.4 5.3 5.1 0.8 0.0 4.7
7B 10.8 12.0 16.1 34.6 12.3 21.8 30.1 20.2 28.6 22.6
A 19.1 19.5 13.5 1.9 18.0 5.0 2.8 3.2 0.0 4.7
8B 9.8 18.5 14.3 18.3 12.1 27.2 27.2 23.4 53.3 27.3
A 9.4 9.1 5.5 2.4 8.9 2.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.8
9B 10.1 16.3 18.4 23.6 12.7 36.9 39.6 38.0 29.6 37.2
A 8.3 8.1 3.5 0.0 7.6 1.9 1.3 0.5 0.0 1.7
10 B 25.8 41.5 39.5 58.2 32.3 49.3 45.2 41.0 42.5 47.6
A 2.9 3.2 2.1 0.7 2.8 0.8 0.5 1.0 2.1 0.8
RETA
B 91.9 85.6 80.8 83.9 89.1 96.5 95.6 94.9 93.9 96.0
A 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Note: A   above; B   below.
5. An alternative solution to this problem is to impute to self-employed an average earnings
proﬁle obtained from alternative sources (the recent European Community Household Panel
[ECHP] constitutes an excellent example; see Peracchi 2002 for a description).• Backward: wt–k–    ct–k, for     1, . . . , L
• Forward: wt m   ct(1   g)m, for m   1, . . . , M with g   0.005
In other words, we assume that contributions were constant up to the
ﬁrst time they are observed, while they grow at a constant annual rate of 0.5
percent thereafter.
It is important to recall, from section 9.2, that current Spanish legisla-
tion allows the self-employed to begin drawing retirement pensions with-
out retiring, at least as long as they keep managing their own business.
Hence, in the dynamic choice of the self-employed, the opportunity cost of
retiring is not measured by the loss of future earnings but, instead, by the
fact that contributions cannot longer be accumulated to increase future
pensions and that marginal income taxes must be paid on pensions. This
implies that, for the self-employed, maximization of the (net of taxes) SS
payoﬀ is a very reasonable objective function.
9.5 Evaluation of Social Security Incentives
9.5.1 Assumptions Made in the Computations
For every male worker in the wage sample enrolled in either the RGSS or
the RETA we assume that (a) he is married to a nonworking spouse, (b) his
wife is three years younger, and (c) his mortality corresponds to the base-
line male mortality from the most recent available life tables (INE 1995).
For every female in the wage sample, we assume that (a) she is married
to either a retiree or a worker entitled to retirement beneﬁts, (b) her hus-
band is four years older, and (c) her mortality is the baseline female mor-
tality from the most recent available life tables (INE 1995).
For both men and women we further assume that, starting at age ﬁfty-
ﬁve and until a person reaches age sixty-ﬁve, there are three pathways to re-
tirement: the UB52  program, DI beneﬁts, and early retirement. At each
age, an individual has an age-speciﬁc probability of entering retirement us-
ing any of these three programs. However, we must take into account the
following restrictions.
1. No person has access to early retirement before age sixty
2. After age sixty, a person cannot claim UB52  and can only claim
early retirement or DI beneﬁts
3. A self-employed person enrolled in RETA can never claim UB52 
beneﬁts
9.5.2 Calculating Social Security (SS) Incentives
For a worker of age a, we deﬁne social security wealth (SSW) in case of re-
tirement at age h aas the expected present value of future pension beneﬁts




532 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco PeracchiHere, S is the age of certain death,  s    s–a s, with   denoting the pure
time-discount factor,  s is the conditional survival probability at age s for
an individual alive at age a, and Bs(h) the pension expected at age s   h  
1 in case of retirement at age h. Given SSW, we deﬁne three incentive vari-
ables for a worker of age a.
1. Social security accrual (SSA) is the diﬀerence in SSW from postpon-
ing retirement from age a to age a   1:
SSAa   SSW a 1   SSW a   ∑
S
s a 2
 s[Bs(a 1)   Bs(a)]    a 1Ba 1(a)
The SSA is positive if the expected present value ΣS
s a 2 s[Bs(a 1) –
Bs(a)] of the increment in the ﬂow of pension beneﬁts is greater than the ex-
pected present value  a 1Ba 1(a) of the pension beneﬁt foregone by post-
poning retirement. If the increments Bs(a 1) – Bs(a) are small, as it is usu-
ally the case, then the SSA is negative. The rescaled negative accrual  a  
–SSA/W a 1, where W a 1 equals expected net earnings at age a   1 based on
the information available up to age a, is called the implicit tax or subsidy
on postponing retirement from age a to age a   1.
2. Peak value PV a   maxh(SSW h – SSW a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where R
is a mandatory retirement age (which, strictly speaking, does not exist
in Spain; given the retirement evidence we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume R
equals 70). Thus, the peak value is the maximum diﬀerence in SSW be-
tween retiring at any future age and retiring at age a.
3. Option value OV a   maxh(V h – V a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where




is the total expected utility of retiring at age a, and








is the total expected utility of retiring at age h   a. Thus, the option value
is the maximum utility diﬀerence between retiring at any future age and re-
tiring at age a. We parameterize the model by assuming   equals 0.97,  
equals 1, and k equals 1.25. Under our assumptions, V a equals 1.25 SSW a
and
V h   ∑
h
s a 1
 sW s   1.25SSW h.
If expected earnings are constant at W a (as assumed by our earnings
model), then
V h   V a   W a ∑
h
s a 1
 s   1.25(SSW h   SSW a),
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except for the eﬀect due to the term Σh
s a 1 s.
The restrictions embodied in the fourth assumption require us to com-
bine the incentive measures Ij from the various programs (j   UB, DI, R,
where UB denotes unemployment beneﬁts; DI, disability beneﬁts; and R,
the retirement programs) as follows:
I   
where pa
DI denotes the probability of observing a transition from employ-
ment into disability at age a. Since the self-employed have no access to
UB52  beneﬁts, the combined incentives from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to age ﬁfty-
nine for members of this group change to
I   IDIpa
DI   IR(1   pa
DI), 55   a   59.
We follow a regression-based approach to compute the unconditional
probability of qualifying for a disability pension (see table 9.12 for sum-
mary statistics by regime, sex, and age).6The model is estimated, separately
if 55   a   60
if 60   a   65
if 65   a,
IDIpa
DI   IUB(1   pa
DI)
IDIpa
DI   IR(1   pa
DI)
I
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Table 9.12 Unconditional Disability Take-Ups, by Regime, Sex, and Age (1985–94)
RGSS RETA
Age Male Female Male Female
55 1.26 0.87 0.83 0.75
56 1.40 1.17 1.21 0.92
57 1.41 1.34 1.31 1.08
58 1.60 1.40 1.56 1.29
59 1.61 1.15 1.64 1.43
60 1.92 1.74 2.22 1.65
61 2.00 2.21 2.08 1.29
62 1.96 1.89 2.32 2.05
63 1.99 2.18 2.27 2.10
64 1.61 2.81 2.75 2.01
65 1.10 1.87 1.15 1.88
66 1.61 1.08 1.65 2.39
67 1.34 3.10 2.66 2.20
68 1.65 2.14 1.26 1.37
69 2.21 3.61 1.69 2.26
70 2.25 0.00 0.81 1.65
6. We decided to model the unconditional probability of qualifying for a disability pension
because it is the option that best captures the tightness of the SS system in the concession of
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Table 9.13 SSW, Accrual, and Tax Incentive Measures (1985 system, 1995 sample;
in 1995 US$)
SSA Median of Tax
Median
Age N SSW P10 Median P90 SD Sample Simulated
RGSS Male Sample
55 2,609 95,311 –3,538 –3,265 15,466 7,231 26.8 21.6
56 1,593 95,005 –3,553 –2,120 15,674 7,626 19.3 10.8
57 1,772 95,980 –3,525 1,420 13,418 7,294 –10.9 15.3
58 1,981 100,033 –3,526 2,363 13,282 7,334 –23.6 36.2
59 1,975 104,421 –3,513 3,507 13,552 7,369 –36.0 28.6
60 1,734 112,619 –4,527 5,910 13,619 9,102 –47.4 –14.9
61 1,166 126,567 –4,449 6,559 12,995 8,385 –50.4 –12.0
62 1,063 130,285 –4,462 5,289 11,806 8,098 –42.2 –11.0
63 969 134,383 –4,464 3,876 10,090 7,111 –33.9 4.6
64 717 134,735 –5,023 2,797 9,321 7,046 –25.8 16.0
65 512 131,576 –14,917 –5,437 –879 7,622 61.9 77.5
69 12 117,295 –10,582 –5,174 –1,721 4,312 60.4 70.0
RETA Male Sample
55 563 77,772 –24 –14 –3 1,670 0.3 41.6
56 414 80,379 –29 –22 –13 1,320 0.4 40.1
57 416 82,930 –40 –26 –12 2,446 0.5 39.0
58 430 85,611 –36 –33 4 2,269 0.6 37.7
59 467 88,307 –43 –38 67 2,165 0.7 35.3
60 422 91,132 –4,388 –4,345 –4,178 4,598 83.9 106.5
61 374 89,514 –4,381 –4,308 7,726 6,859 83.1 94.5
62 346 87,907 –4,360 –3,925 8,339 5,616 75.7 48.7
63 299 86,471 –4,371 –1,279 3,529 5,769 24.7 15.3
64 283 84,836 –4,907 2,610 5,006 3,995 –50.4 26.8
65 219 87,132 –4,967 –2,277 –971 2,229 43.9 100.7
69 15 76,862 –4,976 –2,791 –2,791 1,053 53.9 95.2
(continued)
by sex and regime, using the data from the HLSS for the period 1985–1994.
The set of regressors include age and region dummies and a cubic time
trend for all the regimes. For people in RGSS we also consider industry and
group of contribution dummies.
9.5.3 Results under the 1985 System
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 present the estimates of SS incentives by age (omit-
ting ages sixty-six to sixty-eight) for the combined set of options (UB, DI,
or R) described earlier. Incentives are computed separately by sex, and
earnings projections are based on the methodology and the assumptions
described in section 9.4.1.
Table 9.13 presents median values for SSW, SSA, and the implicit tax or
subsidy to work, as well as the ﬁrst and ninth decile and the standard devi-
ation of the accrual. For comparison purposes, the column labeled “simu-
lated” reports the age proﬁles of the implicit tax constructed for synthetic536 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi
Table 9.13 (continued)
SSA Median of Tax
Median
Age N SSW P10 Median P90 SD Sample Simulated
RGSS Female Sample
55 569 75,376 –3,469 –3,440 8,564 4,953 37.9 43.2
56 346 74,441 –3,469 –3,430 8,285 5,083 37.2 41.9
57 375 73,605 –3,479 –3,404 8,268 5,159 32.1 40.9
58 445 79,449 –3,466 –3,262 9,245 5,661 31.5 39.5
59 409 82,798 –3,457 –2,739 9,692 5,615 23.6 29.4
60 381 83,095 –18,703 –1,305 13,096 12,674 14.7 –4.3
61 311 98,829 –18,666 5,388 13,557 14,004 –52.8 –55.9
62 294 96,258 –3,803 5,501 12,800 10,339 –54.6 –27.2
63 276 96,240 –3,797 5,226 10,295 9,034 –54.1 –8.9
64 194 104,197 –4,300 3,858 9,749 12,840 –41.5 –0.3
65 167 95,158 –9,839 –3,340 1,075 6,041 48.5 78.7
69 14 65,969 –9,099 –4,003 –2,358 2,212 65.7 69.9
RETA Female Sample
55 240 59,685 –32 –5 –2 1,318 0.1 41.8
56 158 61,714 –25 –8 –3 1,494 0.2 40.5
57 168 63,756 –46 –12 –5 1,039 0.2 39.7
58 182 65,883 –45 –17 –7 885 0.3 38.5
59 209 68,081 –53 –23 –10 1,158 0.4 36.4
60 207 70,532 –3,782 –3,698 –3,107 7,198 71.4 97.1
61 165 68,662 –18,358 –3,722 –858 11,749 71.8 92.8
62 137 67,369 –3,745 –3,425 3,918 10,440 66.1 81.4
63 177 65,788 –3,745 –2,289 5,866 7,640 44.2 –23.5
64 122 64,202 –4,193 1,932 5,466 9,036 –37.3 –14.6
65 110 66,026 –4,214 –56 164 4,571 1.1 68.3
69 28 58,198 –2,255 –742 –552 2,261 14.3 76.4
Note: N = number of observations; P10   tenth percentile; P90   ninetieth percentile; SD = standard
deviation.
individuals using the criteria described in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and
Peracchi (1999). More precisely, we consider the following cases.
1. Male in RGGS: base case as in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Perac-
chi (1999, 338)
2. Male in RETA: same as above, but with thirty-two years of contribu-
tions at age sixty and contributing to the minimum
3. Female in RGSS: twenty years of contributions at age sixty, without
dependent spouse and receiving 60 percent of the sample average wage
4. Female in RETA: same as above, but with twenty-two years of con-
tribution at age sixty, without a dependent spouse, and always having con-
tributed to the minimum
For men in the RGSS, the SSW starts oﬀat $95,311 (1995 exchange rate)
and peaks between sixty-three and sixty-four years of age at $134,735. Thetenth percentile of the accrual is negative at all ages. The median accrual is
negative until age ﬁfty-six, becomes positive between ﬁfty-seven and sixty-
four, and then negative at older ages. Notice that, except after age sixty-
ﬁve, there is little agreement between our median or average tax rate and
the simulated base case in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi (1999).
Part of this discrepancy is due to a technical correction in the set of as-
sumptions made in the computation of incentives before normal retire-
ment age. In Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi (1999), we assumed
that when a person stops working between age ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine,
their pension is computed considering earnings until that age, even if they
start receiving the pension only at age sixty. In this present matter, for an
individual aged between ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine, we assume instead that
• They receive unemployment beneﬁts until age sixty and retirement
beneﬁts thereafter; and
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Table 9.14 Peak and Option Value Incentive Measures (1985 System, in 1995 US$)
Peak Value Option Value
Age N P10 P50 P90 SD P10 P50 P90 SD
RGSS Male Sample
55 2,609 –3,529 18,384 86,697 35,220 3,319 124,264 311,883 119,742
56 1,563 –3,546 18,228 75,456 31,228 2,690 111,068 284,558 109,823
57 1,772 –3,518 19,871 60,505 25,333 2,049 103,772 245,406 91,044
58 1,981 –3,525 15,379 50,096 21,085 1,382 85,871 215,663 80,676
59 1,975 –3,513 13,827 41,647 18,759 702 73,011 187,562 70,260
60 1,734 –4,508 13,384 35,447 16,834 0 65,032 162,590 59,415
61 1,166 –4,439 12,949 28,876 14,286 4,023 58,829 143,823 49,550
62 1,063 –4,453 9,800 23,764 12,001 3,337 46,348 116,935 40,827
63 969 –4,458 6,511 17,902 9,459 593 33,269 82,473 31,124
64 717 –5,023 2,806 9,798 7,815 0 19,916 67,644 29,071
65 512 –14,710 –5,388 –687 7,745 0 3,567 39,548 21,755
69 12 –10,582 –5,174 –1,721 4,312 0 2,432 12,755 7,527
RETA Male Sample
55 563 –4 1 48 12,234 31,203 38,383 40,927 28,280
56 414 –20 –14 6 9,960 23,017 33,906 34,129 23,042
57 416 –29 –25 217 12,207 21,707 29,294 35,741 27,015
58 430 –35 –33 964 10,878 14,391 24,528 34,185 23,836
59 467 –42 –38 8,023 10,760 10,433 19,715 45,954 23,273
60 422 –4,388 –4,345 2,920 10,031 5,272 14,216 31,141 18,699
61 374 –4,378 –4,307 19,124 13,007 5,460 13,947 52,692 22,595
62 346 –4,360 –1,112 18,030 9,728 4,308 13,413 49,320 18,960
63 299 –4,365 1,312 6,235 7,506 2,058 11,824 23,436 14,432
64 283 –4,907 2,610 5,006 4,371 2,693 10,449 20,114 10,981
65 219 –4,967 –2,277 –971 2,365 90 4,184 8,863 6,352
69 15 –4,976 –2,791 –2,791 1,053 34 1,693 1,693 889
(continued)• The pension is computed at age sixty. From age a to age sixty, the in-
dividual contributes the mandatory minimum level of contributions to
their pension.
For the median worker, this modiﬁcation introduces incentives to keep
working until the early retirement age. However, for the seventy-ﬁfth per-
centile or higher, we still ﬁnd strong incentives to stop working.
For men in RETA, the SSW reaches a peak ($91,132) at sixty but is ﬂat
between ﬁfty-nine and sixty-ﬁve. The median accrual is negative at all ages
except age sixty-four, whereas the opposite occurs with the median implicit
tax. The age-incentive proﬁles for women in the RGSS or the RETA are
similar to those for men, although the median values of our incentive mea-
sure are higher than those for men in the age range sixty to sixty-four. This
is because women have shorter careers and, on average (or at the median),
do not qualify for a full pension in that age range.
Table 9.14 presents the age proﬁle of the median, tenth percentile, and
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Table 9.14 (continued)
Peak Value Option Value
Age N P10 P50 P90 SD P10 P50 P90 SD
RGSS Female Sample
55 569 –3,460 4,363 64,805 28,777 1,283 90,648 233,563 91,939
56 346 –3,465 –745 59,539 26,634 4,007 80,670 207,748 83,268
57 375 –3,464 12,030 49,515 22,512 0 93,303 171,444 71,615
58 445 –3,456 11,121 49,837 21,830 0 74,859 177,974 74,338
59 409 –3,451 16,531 41,702 19,911 781 78,794 142,584 60,987
60 381 –18,654 13,871 39,334 21,953 0 62,281 128,809 55,387
61 311 –18,585 13,840 36,439 22,330 1 56,892 118,919 51,049
62 294 –3,794 11,547 28,191 16,147 0 46,127 93,063 39,942
63 276 –3,790 9,757 19,173 12,009 294 34,382 65,189 28,377
64 194 –4,300 3,858 10,509 12,910 0 18,913 49,401 28,260
65 167 –9,135 –3,294 1,586 7,266 0 6,217 37,962 18,361
69 14 –9,099 –4,003 –2,358 2,212 0 1,372 6,180 2,845
RETA Female Sample
55 240 –28 180 8,934 10,398 36,029 44,058 55,356 22,158
56 158 –25 –8 8,756 11,312 31,578 39,105 51,242 23,707
57 168 –46 –12 8,431 7,212 26,115 34,216 46,872 15,544
58 182 –45 –9 8,117 7,047 10,167 32,113 42,401 16,533
59 209 –45 –23 7,810 6,295 5,273 26,156 37,817 14,472
60 207 –3,769 –2,564 7,104 12,086 12,670 22,642 32,810 17,505
61 165 –18,358 –2,423 9,862 14,296 113 20,000 31,882 10,470
62 137 –3,745 2,411 11,686 13,087 10,576 22,058 29,615 12,153
63 177 –3,742 2,805 10,293 9,122 8,647 20,497 26,610 7,544
64 122 –4,193 2,011 5,466 9,106 10,341 17,729 21,394 6,350
65 110 –4,214 –56 164 4,646 6,422 13,573 15,823 5,399
69 28 –2,255 –742 –552 2,261 2,364 4,255 4,493 1,197
Note: See table 9.13.ninetieth percentile and the standard deviation of the peak and option val-
ues for men and women in the RGSS and the RETA. In all the cases consid-
ered, the peak value and the accrual (presented in the previous table) show
very similar proﬁles. However, from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to age sixty-four, the me-
dian peak value is much higher, thus reinforcing retention incentives in that
age range. From age sixty-ﬁve, they are identical in practically all the cases.
The option value of retiring starts at a very high level for individuals en-
rolled in the RGSS and decreases continuously with age. Note that the
tenth percentile is close to zero at practically all ages, revealing strong re-
tirement incentives for those people. For the individuals in the RETA, the
fact that we have used the contributive proﬁle to approximate earnings ex-
plains why the option value of retirement is very low at all ages compared
to that of people from RGSS. Furthermore, the fact that most of the people
enrolled in the RETA contribute the minimum amount explains why the
tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the option value are very similar.7
9.6 Retirement Models for the Year 1995
This section investigates the explanatory power of our incentive mea-
sures (accrual, peak value, and option value) for retirement behavior. Be-
fore presenting the estimates of our model for the probability of retirement,
we review the available sample evidence for the RGSS (including RMTC)
and the RETA.
9.6.1 Sample Evidence
Figure 9.5shows the patterns of retirement in 1995. The top panels show
the age proﬁle of the exit rate from the labor force by sex and SS regime
(RGSS and RETA on the top-left and top-right panel, respectively). For
men in the RGSS, the age proﬁle of exit rates shows two peaks, at age sixty
and sixty-ﬁve (respectively, the early and normal retirement ages), whereas
for women in the RGSS and both men and women in the RETA, only the
peak at age sixty-ﬁve is evident.
The bottom-left panel plots, for those enrolled in the RGSS, the exit
rate from the labor force at the early retirement age of sixty against the
quantiles of expected earnings at the same age (in 1995 pesetas). Who is
leaving the labor force at age sixty? The answer, especially for men, is
clear from the ﬁgure: those with relatively low wages, in particular, those
with wages below the twenty-ﬁfth percentile. As shown in Jiménez-Martín
and Sánchez (2000), the main cause of retirement for this group is the
interaction between age, the penalties for insuﬃcient contributions, and
the minimum pension provision. In addition, it can be shown that exit
rates from the labor force for women with relatively low earnings are
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7. We must also take into account our lack of information about true earnings for people en-















































































)already nonnegligible at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. Finally, the right-side panel plots
the exit rate at the normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve. It is evident that exit
rates at this age are largely independent of expected wages.
9.6.2 Retirement Models
We follow a regression-based approach to model the eﬀect of SSW, in-
centive measure (either accrual, peak value, or option value), and individ-
ual demographic characteristics on the decision to retire in year 1995 con-
ditional on being active at the end of 1994. Retirement probabilities are
assumed to have the probit form
Pr(Ri   1)    ( 1SSW i    2Ii     
3Xi),
where R is a binary indicator of retirement,   is the distribution function
of a standard normal, I denotes the incentive measure, and X is a vector of
predictors that include individual earnings and sociodemographic charac-
teristics.8
For each incentive measure we present, separately by sex and SS regime,
the results obtained for the following speciﬁcations.
• M1 is basic speciﬁcation and includes three sets of predictors.
M1A includes the incentive measure (accrual, peak value, or option
value), an eligibility dummy for attainment of a minimum of ﬁfteen
years of contributions, and three industry-speciﬁc variables—the
fraction of collective wage settlements having a clause favoring
early retirement, the presence of rules permitting retirement at age
sixty-four without any age penalty, and the existence of mandatory
retirement at age sixty-ﬁve (see the appendix for a brief description
of the data source).
M1B includes a linear age trend, the length of the current employment
spell and its square, the number of years of contribution and its
square, the number of years of potential experience, dummies for
schooling level and the contributive group (only for people in the
RGSS), and dummies for part-time work and the sector of occupa-
tion (only for people in the RGSS).
M1C includes controls for earnings (expected wage, pension, and av-
erage lifetime income and their squares) and the net present value of
expected wages until the year in which either the peak value or the
option value reach their maximum.
• M2 is the same as M1 but age dummies replace the linear age trend.
In table 9.15, we present the main results obtained by ﬁtting our two
models to the observed transitions between 1994 and 1995. We show, for
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8. The socioeconomic and earnings information is richer for the RGSS. Results for the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.each combination of sex and regime, the estimates of the probit coeﬃ-
cients, their estimated standard errors, and the implied probability eﬀect.
Complete deﬁnitions, data sources, as well as summary statistics for all
variables employed are presented in the appendix. Since we report the re-
sults from a large number of models, we concentrate on the variables of in-
terest. The complete set of results is available from the authors upon re-
quest.
On the one hand, we ﬁnd that the basic speciﬁcation with only demo-
graphic and earnings controls (M1) explains, in the case of the RGSS, an
important fraction of the retirement peaks at the early and normal retire-
ment ages. In contrast, this speciﬁcation seems to be unable to capture the
retirement peak at age sixty-ﬁve for workers in the RETA. This is partly
due to the fact that the socioeconomic information for individuals enrolled
in the RETA is poorer than for people enrolled in the RGSS. The SSW term
is positive and signiﬁcant in all cases. Contradictory results are obtained
instead for the incentive variable. In fact, while the accrual usually shows
the expected (negative) sign, both the peak and the option value show the
wrong (positive) sign. Alternatively, neither SSW nor the incentive vari-
ables are signiﬁcant for people enrolled in RETA, indicating that the SSW
and the ﬁnancial variables do not capture retirement incentives for indi-
vidual enrolled in RETA.
On the other hand, the introduction of age dummies (speciﬁcation M2)
always increases the coeﬃcient of both the SSW and the incentive variables
and substantially improves the ﬁt of the model. For men in the RGSS, for
example, the pseudo   R2 for the model with the accrual as the incentive
variable goes from 33.6 percent (model M1) to 37.3 percent (model M2).
For men in RETA, the pseudo-R2 goes from 16.8 to 37.3 percent. The pat-
tern for the other incentive variables (accrual, peak value, or option value)
is very similar.
Figure 9.6 compares the age proﬁle of the empirical hazard rate with
those of the coeﬃcients on the age dummies for the three versions of model
M2 (that is, with the accrual, the peak value, and the option value as the
incentive variable), estimated separately by sex and SS regime. In all cases,
the age dummies have been rescaled to the empirical hazard scale. For
males enrolled in the RGSS (left panels) and all three models (either ac-
crual, peak value, or option value), the proﬁle of the age dummies re-
sembles the hazard proﬁle, although there are some discrepancies between
the two proﬁles at ages sixty to sixty-four and from age sixty-seven onward.
For females enrolled in the RGSS, the discrepancies are more evident at all
ages from ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four, with age ﬁfty-nine as an exception. For in-
dividuals enrolled in RETA, the proﬁles are quite diﬀerent from those esti-
mated for the RGSS. In particular, important discrepancies between ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine and between models are detected.






















































































































In this section we use our estimates to simulate retirement behavior un-
der alternative institutional settings.
9.7.1 Description of the Simulations
In the simulations we consider three policies, of which the third is spe-
ciﬁc to the Spanish case.
R1: A reform of the existing system consisting of a three-year increase in
both the early and the normal retirement age, while keeping all other as-
pects of the Spanish SS system unchanged.
R2: A reform common to all countries considered in this volume including
(a) early entitlement age at sixty; (b) normal retirement age at sixty-ﬁve;
(c) a replacement rate at age sixty-ﬁve equal to sixty percent of the earn-
ings at age ﬁfty-nine; and (d) an actuarial adjustment of 3.4 percent per
year from age sixty to age seventy (this implies a replacement rate of 42
percent at age sixty and 78 percent at age seventy). Notice that (a) and
(b) correspond to the current Spanish system, whereas the actuarial ad-
justment for retirement before age sixty-ﬁve is less favorable than the one
currently used in Spain. The current Spanish system is more generous
for retirement at age sixty-ﬁve and has no actuarial adjustment for post-
poning retirement after that age.
R97: The regime created by the 1997 Spanish reform and currently in
place.
We recall that the 1997 reform, described in section 9.2, implies the fol-
lowing changes in the basic beneﬁt formula and in the penalties related to
age and contributive history: (a) the number of years of contribution used
to construct the beneﬁt base is increased from eight, as prescribed by the
1985 legislation, to ﬁfteen; (b) workers retiring after the age of sixty with
forty or more contributive years are charged an actuarial adjustment of
only 7 percent (instead of 8 percent) for each year under age sixty-ﬁve; and
(c) the penalty for insuﬃcient contributions, expressed as a fraction of BR
to be received (see section 9.2), is changed to
 n   
For each of the three policies we carry out three simulation exercises.
S1: Starts from the model without age dummies (M1), we modify the SSW
and incentive measures in accordance with the new policy. Speciﬁcally,
in the calculation of SSW, we increase by three years the early and the
if n   15
if 15   n   25
if 25   n   35
if 35   n.
0
.5   .03(n   15)
.8   .02(n   25)
1
Micro-Modeling of Retirement Behavior in Spain 547normal retirement ages and shift by three years the age-speciﬁc proba-
bility of receiving DI or UI beneﬁts.
S2: Starts from the model with age dummies (M2), we modify the SSW and
incentive measures according to the assumed policy changes. We also
change the probabilities of receiving DI beneﬁts, as in S1, but not the co-
eﬃcients on the age dummies.
S3: Applies only for reform R1 and starts from the model with age dum-
mies (M2). In addition to the changes described in S2, we also shift the
coeﬃcients on the age dummies by three years, so that the entire age-
proﬁle of the retirement hazard shifts forward by three years.
9.7.2 Results for Male Workers in the RGSS
Figures 9.7 to 9.15show the simulated retirement probabilities by age for
male workers in the RGSS. The results are presented separately for each
combination of simulation (S1 to S3) and incentive variable (accrual, peak
value, and option value). Each graph presents both the age proﬁle of esti-
mated conditional retirement probabilities or the “hazards,” and the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of retirement age.9
In general, because all incentive measures explain little of the variation
in retirement ages across individuals, it is hard to detect the impact of
changes in the incentive measures on individual retirement behavior.
When the coeﬃcients estimated under the speciﬁcation M1 are em-
ployed in the simulations, all the reforms reduce retirement hazard at ages
sixty and age sixty-ﬁve. Although in some cases an increase in the hazard
at ages sixty-three or sixty-four is observed, in general, the CDF of retire-
ment age is shifted to the right. The reduction of the hazard at sixty is more
important for the Spanish reform (R97), while the reduction at age sixty-
ﬁve is more important for the common reform (R2).
When, instead, the coeﬃcients estimated under the speciﬁcation M2 are
used in the simulations but the age dummies coeﬃcients are not shifted
(S2), only the R2 reform seems to sensibly reduce the hazard at the key age
range and thereby reduce the CDF at, for example, age sixty-ﬁve. In fact,
both the R1 and the R97 reform mildly increase the average retirement
hazard at age sixty. This appears to be largely a consequence of the mini-
mum pension rules in eﬀect in Spain. Apart from this, the reduction is more
important when retirement incentives are measured by the option value.
As expected, when the age dummies are shifted by three years (S3; ﬁgures
9.13 to 9.15), the whole hazard for R1 shifts to the right by three years, and
consequently, the CDF is reduced substantially both at age sixty (by 50, 39,
and 37 percent for the accrual, peak value, and option value speciﬁcations,
respectively) and at age sixty-ﬁve (36, 30, and 28 percent for the accrual,
peak value, and option value speciﬁcations, respectively).
548 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi
9. The CDF F(a) at age a is obtained from the conditional retirement probabilities h(a)
through the recursion F(a)   F(a – 1)   [1 – F(a – 1)   h(a)], starting from F(54)   0.Fig. 9.7 Male workers in the RGSS: S1, accrualFig. 9.8 Male workers in the RGSS: S1, peak valueFig. 9.9 Male workers in the RGSS: S1, option valueFig. 9.10 Male workers in the RGSS: S2, accrualFig. 9.11 Male workers in the RGSS: S2, peak valueFig. 9.12 Male workers in the RGSS: S2, option valueFig. 9.13 Male workers in the RGSS: S3, accrualFig. 9.14 Male workers in the RGSS: S3, peak valueFig. 9.15 Male workers in the RGSS: S3, option value9.7.3 Results for Female Workers in the RGSS
Figures 9.16 to 9.18present the simulated retirement probabilities by age
for female workers in the RGSS. Results are presented separately for each
simulation exercise S1 to S3.
When the coeﬃcients estimated under the speciﬁcation M1 are em-
ployed, only the R2 reform reduces the hazard of retirement at both ages
sixty and sixty-ﬁve (ﬁgure 9.16). The reduction is similar for all incentive
measures (about 35 and 37 percent at ages sixty and sixty-ﬁve, respec-
tively). As a consequence, the CDF of retirement age is substantially lower
at age sixty-ﬁve than in the sample. The reduction is slightly bigger under
the peak or the option value (17 percent) than under the accrual (16 per-
cent). On the other hand, both the R1 and R97 reforms are ineﬀective in
reducing the retirement hazard in the relevant age range. Very similar re-
sults are obtained under S2.
In S3, on the other hand, the results for R1 change substantially (ﬁgure
9.18). The CDF at age sixty reduces by 22.5 percent in all cases and by 33.6,
35.1, and 35.6 percent at age sixty-ﬁve for accrual, peak value, and option
value, respectively.
9.7.4 Results for Individuals in the RETA
In ﬁgures 9.19 to 9.22, we present the simulated retirement probabilities
by age for the self-employed or individuals enrolled in the RETA. However,
in this case, we do not report any result based on model M1, since this
model is unable to capture the retirement peaks at sixty and sixty-ﬁve that
are evident in the data. Thus, in each ﬁgure, we present results for combi-
nations of sex and simulation exercise (S2 and S3) jointly for all the incen-
tive variables (accrual, peak value, and option value).
When the coeﬃcients estimated under the speciﬁcation M2 are used in
the simulations but the age-dummies coeﬃcients are not shifted (S2), the
R2 reform seems to considerably reduce the hazard over the key age range
and thereby reduce the CDF at, for example, age sixty-ﬁve. In fact, the
Spanish reform (R97) substantially increases the retirement hazard at all
ages below the normal retirement age (see ﬁgures 9.19 and 9.21 for men
and women, respectively). When the age dummies are shifted by three
years (S3), the whole hazard for R1 shifts three years toward the right, and
consequently, the CDF of retirement age is reduced substantially in all
cases (see ﬁgures 9.20 and 9.22 for men and women, respectively). The re-
duction of the CDF at ages sixty and sixty-ﬁve for men is much more im-
portant when the peak value is employed than it is for either the accrual or
the option value. For example, the reduction for the accrual speciﬁcation
is 19.5 and 34.9 percent for men at ages sixty and sixty-ﬁve, while for the
peak value, it reaches 28.1 and 38.7 percent, and under the option value, it
lowers to 10.7 and 31.4 percent. For women, instead, the reduction is more
558 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco PeracchiFig. 9.16 Female workers in the RGSS: S1Fig. 9.17 Female workers in the RGSS: S2Fig. 9.18 Female workers in the RGSS: S3Fig. 9.19 Male workers in the RETA: S2Fig. 9.20 Male workers in the RETA: S3Fig. 9.21 Female workers in the RETA: S2Fig. 9.22 Female workers in the RETA: S3important for the accrual speciﬁcation (55.4 and 53.7 percent at ages sixty
and sixty-ﬁve, respectively) than for either the peak or the option value
speciﬁcations.
9.7.5 Eﬀects of Reforms on Average Retirement Ages
In table 9.16, we summarize the impact of the proposed reforms on the
average retirement age.10In almost all cases, the impact of the reform varies
considerably across both simulation exercises and choice of the incentive
measures (accrual, peak value, and option value). An exception is the 1997
Spanish reform, and its eﬀect on the average retirement age is very small in
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Table 9.16 Average Retirement Ages from Simulated Policies
Male (observed 62.00) Female (observed 62.31)
R1 R2 R97 R1 R2 R97
RGSS
S1
Accrual 62.19 61.87 61.98 62.90 63.00 62.26
Peak value 61.58 62.74 61.99 62.53 63.34 62.31
Option value 61.41 62.74 62.10 62.51 63.27 62.30
S2
Accrual 61.98 61.81 61.92 62.70 63.04 62.18
Peak value 61.39 62.61 61.90 62.24 63.39 62.22
Option value 61.15 62.54 61.98 62.12 63.33 62.20
S3
Accrual 63.58 — — 64.00 — —
Peak value 62.96 — — 63.54 — —
Option value 62.69 — — 63.49 — —
Male (observed 62.88) Female (observed 62.35)
R1 R2 R97 R1 R2 R97
RETA
S2
Accrual 63.40 63.12 63.03 62.27 62.58 62.47
Peak value 63.51 62.99 63.03 62.56 63.00 62.63
Option value 63.69 62.81 63.06 61.96 62.79 62.63
S3
Accrual 65.38 — — 64.75 — —
Peak value 65.59 — — 64.38 — —
Option value 65.32 — — 63.53 — —
Note: Dashes indicate that data are not available.
10. The average retirement age is obtained as a    Σ70
a 55af(a), where f(a)   F(a – 1) is the
unconditional probability of retiring at age a.general and if anything negative, thus conﬁrming previous evaluations in
Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2000) or Jiménez-Martín (1999).
For male employees in the RGSS (top-left panel of table 9.16) the impact
of R1 and R2 on the average retirement age is unclear. However, we detect
the following regularities. First, R1 has little impact in S1 or S2. Second,
R1 in S3 implies an increase of the average retirement age between 0.69
years (option value speciﬁcation) and 1.58 years (accrual speciﬁcation).
Finally, R2 has a similar impact in either simulation, the impact for the ac-
crual speciﬁcation being much smaller than for either the peak or the op-
tion value.
For female employees in the RGSS (right top panel of table 9.16), the
eﬀect is much more consistent across speciﬁcations of the incentive vari-
able. Again, for S1 and S2, we are able to show a signiﬁcant increase of the
average retirement age (between 0.70 and 1.0 years) only for R2, depend-
ing on the speciﬁcation of the incentive variable. The R1 reform visibly in-
creases the average retirement age in S3 (between 1.2 and 1.7 years) in all
cases.
For a self-employed male in the RETA (bottom-left panel of table 9.16),
the results are very diﬀerent than those obtained for males in the RGSS,
since only R1 is able to signiﬁcantly increase the average retirement age in
either S2 or S3 (between 0.46 and 1.37).11 The R2 reform, instead, reduces
the average retirement age in all cases. Finally, for females in the RETA
(bottom-right panel of table 9.16), the results vary sharply across incentive
speciﬁcations. In S2, only R2 slightly increases retirement age. The eﬀect
of R1 is substantial only in S3, but, in the case of female self-employed, its
eﬀect varies considerably across speciﬁcations of the incentive variable.
9.8 Final Remarks
Summarizing the large number of ﬁndings reported in this study is not
an easy task. We will therefore limit ourselves to the most important re-
sults, paying special attention to those that appear to have at least poten-
tial implications for actual policy.
The ﬁrst important result is that, while economic and ﬁnancial mea-
sures of retirement incentives can go a long way to explain and quantify
retirement behavior, a substantial portion of the latter still remains unex-
plained. Various speciﬁcations of the basic model do decently well for
workers enrolled in the general regime (RGSS) but rather poorly for the
self-employed regime (RETA). This may be attributable, on the one hand,
to the poor quality of the socioeconomic information available and, on
the other hand, to the amply discussed unreliability of the earnings re-
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11. Again, we do not present results of S1 for the self-employed.ported by self-employed Spanish workers. This makes the evaluation of
true expected earnings and opportunity costs of retiring most diﬃcult, if
not impossible.
Of the three quantitative indicators tested, SSW seems to perform uni-
formly better. This is somewhat comforting, as it is the simplest measure of
forward-looking behavior, the easiest to compute, and, quite likely, also the
most reliable, given the available data. The great relevance of age dummies
suggests that institutional factors and coordination incentives play a ma-
jor role in determining workers retirement decisions. This lends credibility
to the view that a proper mix of economic incentives and institutionally
mandated constraints may provide the most eﬀective way to modify and,
in the light of the increasing life expectancy, push forward in time retire-
ment decisions.
Nevertheless, further and more detailed analysis appears to be necessary
in order to properly and safely design much-needed reforms. Because the
ﬁnancial incentives explain only a small portion of the variation in retire-
ment ages across individuals, it is hard to detect the impact of changes in
the incentive measures on individual retirement behavior.
This view, which calls for additional investigation, is conﬁrmed by the re-
sults of our policy simulations. None of the three reforms considered pre-
dicts a major shift of the distribution of retirement ages in the desired for-
ward direction. In particular and, in our view, most importantly (given that
this reform has recently been implemented in Spain), we conﬁrm that R97
has very little impact on retirement incentives and, consequently, on the
average retirement age. In fact, as predicted by earlier and much simpler
studies, it may even shift the distribution of retirement ages in the wrong
direction, especially for low earners.
It seems hard to rank the other two stylized reforms, at least in the light
of our ﬁndings. Both of them seem to move the average retirement age in
the right direction, but only by fairly small amounts (less than two full
years). The R1 reform, deﬁnitely the simplest, tends to perform better than
the R2 reform, but this result is not uniform across regimes and sexes. On
the other hand, R2 (which is designed to be common to all countries con-
sidered in this volume) modiﬁes current Spanish legislation only slightly.
As pointed out above, the early and normal retirement ages selected by R2
coincide with those already in place in Spain. The only diﬀerence is the ac-
tuarial adjustment for retirement before age seventy, which is considerably
less favorable than the one currently used in Spain. Our ﬁnding that even a
relatively sizeable reduction in SSW would increase the average retirement
age by only about one-and-a-half year is a direct consequence of the fact
that SSW explains much less than half of the total variability in Spanish re-
tirement age. Uncovering the socioeconomic factors explaining the resid-
ual half of such variability is therefore crucial for designing an eﬀective
reform.
568 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco PeracchiAppendix
From Covered Earnings to Earnings; Workers in the RGSS
The relationship between earnings wt, covered earnings (base de coti-
zación) et, and beneﬁt base (base reguladora) Bt follows. The value of et is a
doubly censored version of wt, speciﬁcally,
et   max[ t, min(wt, ut)],
where  t and ut are lower and upper ceilings mandated annually, while Bt is




for a suitable set of weights bj.
For each person i in our sample, we observe covered earnings eit at each
year during the period 1986–1995 in which the person works. From these
data, we have to compute Bitusing formula (1) and impute wit, which is not
observed whenever it exceeds utor falls below  t. Clearly, imputation is only
needed for those observations such that eit    t or eit   ut, and not for the
others that are fully observed.
To impute wit, we proceed as follows. We assume that the marginal dis-
tribution of the logarithm of earnings, ln wit, is normal with mean  it  
 t    t
⊥Xit and variance  t
2, where Xit is a vector of observable individual
characteristics. The model parameters  t,  , and  t
2 are then estimated us-
ing maximum likelihood. To perform these calculations, we neglect left cen-
soring.
When eit   ut (the observation is right censored), a naive imputation of
wit is
w ˆit    ˆ it    ˆ    ˆ
t
⊥Xit,
with the estimated mean of wit under the tobit model. Since we know that
wit is at least equal to ut, a better approach is to use instead the estimated
conditional mean of wit, given that wit   ut, speciﬁcally,
w ˆit    ˆ it    ˆ (ct)   ε ˆit,
where ct   (ut –   ˆ it)/  ˆ,    (ct)    (ct)/[1 –  (ct)], and  ( ) and  ( ) denote,
respectively, the density and the distribution function of a standard nor-
mal.
Replacing in the original data set the censored values eit with the impu-
tations w ˆ itgives a set of “completed data” that may be treated (to a ﬁrst ap-
proximation) as the true earnings.
With the complete data we may estimate a ﬁxed-eﬀects model for the
level of earnings, use the estimates from this model to project earnings for-
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eﬁt base (necessary for computing projected payroll taxes and projected
pension amounts) and the implicit tax for working one additional year.
Unemployment Beneﬁts
The Spanish Social Protection system provides contributory and non-
contributory coverage against unemployment spells through the Instituto
Nacional Empleo (INEM).
Contributory Unemployment Beneﬁts
A program exists protecting employees against a nonvoluntary unem-
ployment spell. Duration of beneﬁts ranges from 120 to 720 days, increas-
ing at the rate of 120 days per year of contribution within the previous six
years. The amount of beneﬁts is a function of the beneﬁt base, which is the
average of the contributive bases during the 180 days preceding the un-
employment spell. The minimum beneﬁt amount in 1999 was PTA 69,611,
or $405 (PTA 150) equals $1). The maximum beneﬁt amount is a function
of the number of dependent children. Without children, it equals PTA
137,395 or $916. With two or more children, it equals PTA 177,793, or
$1,185. Unemployment beneﬁts are subject to both SS contributions and
income taxes.
Subsidy for Workers Aged Fifty-Two and Older
A special unemployment scheme exists for those workers ﬁfty-two and
older who (a) are otherwise eligible for a retirement pension, except for
their age and (b) have an income below 75 percent of the monthly mini-
mum wage, which is PTA 51,952. The beneﬁt amounts to 75 percent of the
monthly minimum wage. It can be collected until the person reaches a re-
tirement age, either early or normal.
Disability Pensions
The SS system provides insurance against both temporary and perma-
nent illness or disability.
Temporary Illness or Disability
The subsidy for temporary illness or disability (incapacidad laboral tran-
sitoria) was not regulated by the 1985 reform, and its terms of provision
have undergone frequent changes.
Eligibility requires aﬃliation to the SS system for a minimum period that
depends upon the nature of the covered risk. Common illness requires only
180 days of contributions during the last ﬁve years, and paid maternity or
paternity leave requires at least nine months before the date of delivery and
180 days during the last twelve months, whereas no minimum eligibility
criterion is imposed for work-related accidents or illnesses.
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months. In case of a common illness or a non-work-related accident, the
subsidy is equal to 6 percent of the beneﬁt base for each day of absence be-
tween the fourth and the twentieth and to 75 percent of the beneﬁt base af-
terwards until the maximum period is reached. It is always equal to 75 per-
cent in case of work-related accident or illness and in case of maternity or
paternity leave (only one of the parents being allowed to use the subsidy for
each child). The maximum period for which the subsidy can be received is
eighteen months, after which the worker must either return to work or be
classiﬁed as “permanently disabled.”
Contributive Disability Pensions
Permanent disability pensions have played an important role in allowing
Spanish workers to retire at ages earlier than sixty. In particular, they have
been used extensively during the late 1970s and early 1980s as an early re-
tirement mechanism for workers in restructuring industries (shipbuilding,
steel, mining, and so forth) or as substitutes for long-term unemployment
subsidies in depressed regions. The total disability rate (as a percentage of
the workforce) doubled in less than ten years, from about 0.7 percent in
1975 to 1.5 percent in 1983. The 1985 reform, by tightening the require-
ments, managed to bring the phenomenon under partial control. Disabil-
ity rates have since decreased, stabilizing around 0.6 percent (see table
9A.1 for an illustration).
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Table 9A.1 Percentage Ratio Between the Number of Disability Pensions Paid and
the Number of Workers Covered by the Various SS Programs,
1981–1994
Year RGSS RETA REAa REAb REMC RETM REEH Total
1981 0.79 1.06 2.29 2.14 2.33 — 2.32 1.10
1982 1.15 1.06 3.17 2.34 3.61 — 2.79 1.45
1983 1.31 1.03 3.02 2.33 3.21 — 2.88 1.54
1984 1.17 0.83 2.41 2.14 2.91 — 2.57 1.33
1985 0.72 0.58 1.61 1.80 1.52 — 2.48 0.90
1986 0.62 0.57 1.67 1.97 1.80 1.58 1.93 0.83
1987 0.55 0.51 1.34 1.84 1.42 1.34 2.00 0.72
1988 0.52 0.51 1.21 2.06 1.69 1.45 2.21 0.70
1989 0.43 0.43 1.13 1.95 1.64 1.12 2.25 0.60
1990 0.44 0.51 1.21 2.38 2.36 1.22 2.90 0.62
1991 0.41 0.57 1.30 2.58 2.18 1.18 3.30 0.62
1992 0.47 0.64 1.37 2.53 2.37 1.26 3.12 0.67
1993 0.47 0.68 1.25 2.15 2.29 1.25 2.85 0.64
1994 0.44 0.77 1.35 1.91 2.03 1.24 2.75 0.61
Notes:General Fund (RGSS); self-employed (RETA); agricultural employees (REAa); farm-
ers (REAb); coal miners (REMC); sailors (RETM); domestic workers (REEH). Dashes indi-
cate that data are not available.Disability pensions are distinguished into contributory and noncon-
tributory. We limit ourselves to the contributory pensions. Eligibility and
pension amounts depend on the level of disability. The 1985 reform distin-
guished four levels of permanent disability characterized by increasing
severity. Since then, the legislation has formally reduced them to three, but
has also created a special subcase of the ﬁrst level with the explicit purpose
of using the disability funds to subsidize the dismissal of old workers from
certain sectors or geographic areas.
The ﬁrst level (incapacidad permanente total para la profesión habitual;
IPT) corresponds to inability to do the usual job. A special subcase (inca-
pacidad permanente total cualiﬁcada para la profesión habitual; IPTC) ap-
plies only to employees older than ﬁfty-ﬁve that are in particular socioeco-
nomic situations. The second level (incapacidad permanente absoluta;IPA)
corresponds to inability to do any kind of job. The third level (gran in-
validez; GI) requires, in addition to the inability to perform work, contin-
ued attendance by other persons in order to carry out the basic vital func-
tions.
When disability is caused by an ordinary illness, eligibility to a pension
requires from ﬁve to ﬁfteen years of contributions, depending on the age
when the person fell ill and the seriousness of the disability. There is no con-
tributive requirement when the disability is caused by an accident (whether
work related or not) or a professional illness. Table 9A.2shows the fraction
of new disability pensions awarded to individuals aged ﬁfty-six and older
by program and regime.
Eligibility requirements are fairly complicated. We try here to streamline
their presentation. In the cases of IPA or GI, ﬁfteen years of contributions
are required, of which at least three must be during the last ten years. For
the other two cases (IPT and IPTC), eligibility depends on age. For persons
aged twenty-six or younger, the requirement is half of the number of years
between the age of sixteen and the age when disability began. For persons
older than twenty-six, the requirement is either ﬁve years or one-fourth of
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Table 9A.2 Fraction of New Disability Pensions Awarded to Individuals Aged 55+,
by SS Program and Level of Disability (1994)
Program IPT IPA GI
RGSS 4.0 43.5 39.3
RETA 53.4 64.4 49.3
REA 58.5 63.7 68.9
REMC 0.3 48.6 60.0
RETM 14.9 32.1 32.0
REEH 25.0 75.0 80.6
Notes: Inability to do the usual job (IPT); inability to do any kind of job (IPA); complete in-
ability (GI). See table 9.A1 for deﬁnitions of program variables.the number of years between the age of twenty and the age when disability
began, whichever is largest. Furthermore, at least one-ﬁfth of the required
contributory years must have occurred during the last ten years.
The beneﬁt base depends on the source of disability. In case of ordinary
illness, it is computed the same as for old age pensions. For a non-work-
related accident, it is the average annual wage over a period of twenty-four
consecutive months chosen by the person from the last seven years of work.
For a work-related accident or professional illness, it is the average wage in
the last year of work.
The pension equals 55 percent of the beneﬁt base under IPT and in-
creases to 75 percent under IPTC. In case of IPA, it is equal to 100 of the
beneﬁt base, whereas for GI it is equal to 100 percent of the beneﬁt base
plus another 50 percent covering the person taking care of the disabled.
Disability pensions are indexed to inﬂation, like the other pensions of
the RGSS. Unlike the latter, however, disability pensions may be kept while
earning income from a job diﬀerent from the one for which the disability
(even a complete one) was determined.
Data and Variables
In this section, we deﬁne the variables that have been employed in the
speciﬁcation of the reduced-form probit (see table 9A.3for descriptive sta-
tistics). The data source is the HLSS (see Martínez 1999 for description),
unless we otherwise stated.
Variables from HLSS: Experience, Education, and Occupation
• Spell: length of the current spell in the data set
• History: history in the data set (i.e., length of participation to the la-
bor market)
• Part Time: indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual
does not work full time
• Fraction Working: history divided by potential experience (time
elapsed since ﬁrst time observed in the data set)
• Temporary illness: length of history spent in temporary illness
• Sector: 1-digit SIC industry classiﬁcation
• Contributive group: ten groups, from college degree to unskilled blue-
collars
• Education: proxy for the level of education, constructed as follows—
all individuals in contributive group 1 (i.e., college) are assigned to the
college level of the educational variable, People belonging to con-
tributive groups 2, 3, and 4 are assigned to the high school (diploma)
category, and people in the remaining contributive groups are as-
signed to a general class labeled “less than high school”
• Years of contributions: number of years contributed
• Eligibility indicator: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.individual meets the contributive threshold (ﬁfteen years of contribu-
tions) and zero otherwise
• Pension amount: see section 9.2 for a detailed description
• Average lifecycle earnings: constructed on the basis of a ﬁxed-eﬀect
model for each contributive group
• Expected earnings: see section 9.4.1 for description
• Expected-earnings peak indicator: discounted sum of the expected
earning from the present to the year the peak is reached
• Expected-earnings OV indicator: discounted sum of the expected earn-
ing from the present to the year the option value (OV) is maximized
• Minimum pension indicator: a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if
the individual’s expected retirement pension falls below the minimum
retirement pension
• Censoring earnings indicators: two dummy variables—the ﬁrst takes
value of 1 if the individual’s level of contributions falls below the min-
imum (mandatory) level of contributions, and the second takes value
of 1 if the individual’s level of contribution is greater than the maxi-
mum level of contributions
Variables from the Collective Settlements Register 
(Estadística de Convenios Colectivos; ECC)
Since we do not have direct information about regulations aﬀecting spe-
ciﬁc workers, we use the Spanish register of collective settlements in order
to construct proxies for such regulations. In particular, using the ECC [see
Jiménez-Martín (1998) for a brief description of the source], we have con-
structed three indicators of the coverage of early and mandatory retire-
ment provisions for each (2-digit SIC) industry.
• Early retirement indicator: fraction (weighted by employment) of col-
lective settlements including a prevision favoring early retirement
• Retirement at sixty-four: fraction (weighted by employment) of col-
lective settlements including a provision to facilitate retirement of
workers aged sixty-four without incurring any age penalty (this vari-
able only applies to people aged sixty-four enrolled in RGSS)
• Mandatory retirement at sixty-ﬁve: fraction (weighted by employ-
ment) of collective settlements including a provision promoting man-
datory retirement at sixty-ﬁve (this variable only applies to people aged
sixty-ﬁve enrolled in RGSS)
We refer to Martínez (1999) for a detailed description of the variables
and for summary statistics of the histories, covered earnings, and beneﬁts
ﬁles.
Complementary Data Sources
At various stages of this work, we have made use of the following com-
plementary data sets: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF; INE
576 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi1995a), 1973–1974, 1980–1981, and 1990–1991; Encuesta de Estructura
Salarial (EES; INE 1997) 1995; Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Fa-
miliares (ECPF; INE 1998) 1985–1995; EPA 1987–1998. All these data sets
are collected by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). A brief
description follows.
• EPF: A cross-sectional household budget survey carried out in 1974,
1981, and 1991, with reference to income and expenditure in the pre-
vious calendar year (the 1990–1991 sample covers 21,155 households
and 72,123 individuals)
• EES: A cross-sectional survey of the Spanish wage structure carried
out in 1995 with reference to wages paid that year. It collects detailed
information about gross wages, SS contributions, working hours, and
personal characteristics of about 175,000 workers in 19,000 establish-
ments. The EES is useful for understanding the relation between cov-
ered earnings and actual earnings for those cases in which the latter ex-
ceed the former, since it simultaneously reports both gross wages and
contributions, together with relevant professional characteristics of
the individual.
• ECPF: A rotating household survey carried out quarterly since 1985.
It collects data on income, consumption, net quarterly income (broken
down by source: wages, self-employment income, capital income,
transfers, and subsidies), and personal characteristics (especially
those of the household head and their spouse) for about 3,000 house-
holds.
• EPA: A quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish house-
holds. It contains detailed information on labor force status and edu-
cation and family background variables but no information on wages
and income. Publicly released cross-sectional ﬁles are available from
1976 onwards. Starting with 1987, INE also releases the so-called En-
cuesta de Poblacion Activa Enlazada, or EPAL, which is the panel ver-
sion of EPA obtained by exploiting the rotating cross-sectional nature
of the original survey. It contains fewer variables than EPOA, but it
permits to follow individuals for up to six consecutive months.
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